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Book Review
Anchors and Flotsam: Is Evidence Law "Adrift"?
Evidence Law Adrift. By Mirjan R. Damagka. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1997. Pp. x, 160. $27.50.
Richard D. Friedmant
Difference, as well as distance, yields perspective. A comparison of legal
systems may search for common underlying principles, or for lessons that one
system might learn from another. But it may also be aimed primarily at
illuminating one system by light shed from another. This is the aim of
Evidence Law Adrift,' Mirjan Damagka's elegant study of the common law
system of evidence, and he is ideally suited for the task. Born and schooled in
Continental Europe, he has lived and taught in the United States for twenty-
five years. His relation to the common law system of evidence is, I suspect,
much like his relation to the English language: He has come to both relatively
late, bringing with him a distinctively European sensibility. Consequently,
rather like the person who speaks a foreign language with painfully correct
grammar, he may take the rhetoric of Anglo-American evidence law somewhat
too seriously. But in most respects he is as much a master of the evidentiary
system of the common law as he is of its language, which is saying a great
deal. Although Damaka disclaims an ambition to "break much new ground"2
or offer "great epiphanies," 3 he hopes that his "comparative looking glass' 4
will unveil "unfamiliar horizons."5 He succeeds very well.
t Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Many thanks to Don Herzog. Jerry Israel.
Mike Macnair, and Steve Penrod.
1. MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFr (1997).
2. Id. at 6.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 5.
5. Id. at 6.
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Indeed, all in all this is an excellent book. It is brief, enormously broad in
scope, and very specific in its attention to a multitude of issues. Writing a
book with two of these traits is not particularly difficult, but getting all three
together is exceedingly so. Dama~ka succeeds in part because his writing,
while marked by great flair, is quite terse. He sprinkles the page with
metaphors and, rather too liberally, foreign language phrases. But these do not
take up too much space, and he exercises excellent judgment in including no
more detail than is necessary to make his points. He has a nice touch for
briefly and lucidly summarizing major procedural systems, differences, and
trends. The result is a book that is rich and concentrated without feeling dense;
it can be read quickly, but it rewards close, note-taking, margin-filling study.
So just imagine what nice things I might say if I agreed with more of
Dama~ka's main argument. Dama~ka identifies three features of the common
law evidentiary system that, from a Continental perspective, stand out as
characteristic: "the complexity of common law regulation; a preoccupation with
sifting the material for the factfinder to hear and see; and an aspiration to
structure the analysis of evidence. ' '6 He then analyzes in considerable depth
three "supporting pillar[s]" 7 of the system, which he believes account in large
part for these features. These pillars are "the peculiar organization of the trial
court; the temporal concentration of proceedings; and the prominent roles of
the parties and their counsel in legal proceedings."8 According to Dama~ka,
"[c]racks have.., appeared in all three." 9 The lay jury, the most distinctive
aspect of the Anglo-American trial court, is shrinking in importance;'0 greatly
expanded discovery procedures have lessened the degree of temporal
concentration in legal proceedings;" and even the adversary system, which
relies heavily on the parties and their counsel to discover, assemble, and
present evidence, is undergoing strain as both the role of the judge and the
consequences of litigation to third parties become greater. 2 Because they
undermine the rationale for much of evidentiary law, these "changes of the
institutional milieu"' 3 are responsible in large part for the recent surge of
evidentiary reforms throughout the common law world. They are also
responsible for a general state of dissatisfaction: "[D]octrines and practices
heretofore invested with meaning now increasingly appear as mere
technicalities-legal rituals devoid of deeper sense."'14
6. Id. at 8.
7. Id. at 4.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 6.
10. See id. at 126-29.
11. See id. at 129-34.
12. See id. at 134-39.
13. Id. at 6.
14. Id.
1922 [Vol. 107: 1921
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Though a historian of great breadth and ability,"5 Dama~ka consciously
takes a primarily analytical, rather than historical, approach in Evidence Law
Adrift.16 He analyzes his three supporting pillars at some length, but in a
rather time-detached way; the pillars do not stand today as he first describes
them, and only toward the end of the book does he address how recent
changes undermine them.' 7 The structure makes the book readily accessible,
but it does have flaws. It suggests that there is a static thing, the classical
common law of evidence, that fit the institutions of an earlier day, but that
those institutions have now changed. In fact, the picture is far more dynamic;
the institutions have always been in flux and so too (whether in good time or
not is another matter) has the law of evidence. The book's structure also
shrouds values of enduring importance that come into sharper relief when
viewed over a perspective of time.
I would not think of challenging Damagka on how the Anglo-American
system appears from a Continental perspective, but I can assess whether his
description accurately captures the system with which I am familiar. In Part I
of this Review, therefore, I discuss two of the features that Dama~ka identifies
as characteristic of the common law system of evidence:" its tendency to
limit the evidence available to the factfinder, and its goal of structuring the
analysis that the factfinder performs. I believe his characterization is accurate
in some respects but not in others. In analyzing the first characteristic, I
generally place less weight than Damaka does on the goal of ensuring factual
accuracy. And, regarding the second characteristic, I believe that the picture
Damaka presents is considerably overdrawn.
More broadly, I believe that Damaka's description of the common law
system is incomplete. Thus, in Part II, I temporarily take the agenda from
Damaka, turning to certain aspects of the common law system that I believe
he underemphasizes and that explain a great deal of Anglo-American
evidentiary law. I discuss especially the significance of a concept of individual
rights that-especially in its American variant and especially as it favors a
criminal accused-is different from, and generally stronger than, its counterpart
in Continental systems. An ideological commitment to individual rights is
crucial not only to many common law evidentiary doctrines, but also to the
institutional factors that lie at the heart of Dama.ka's study. I also discuss two
15. See, e.g., MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AL"IiORITY 29-46 (1986);
Mijan R. Damaka, Hearsay in Cinquecento Italy. in I STUDI IN ONORE DI VITrORIO DF_,-tI 59 (Miclhele
Taruffo ed., 1994).
16. See DAMASKA, supra note I, at 3 (descnbing the difference between histoncal and analytical
approaches and stating that his approach "will be predominantly analytical and Interpretivc-).
17. See id. at 126-42.
18. Throughout this Review, I refer, as does DamaAka. to the common law or Anglo-American system.
Except in historical discussion, however, my principal focus will be on the American vanant of that system.
the variant I know best and the one that probably adheres most closely to the traditions of the Anglo-
American system. See infra text accompanying note 145 (discussing the American retention of trial by jury
in civil litigation).
19981 1923
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other factors that are to some extent subsidiary to this rights orientation: the
Anglo-American tcndency to legalize evidentiary issues, seeking to the extent
feasible uniform results across cases; and an intellectual style that values
analytical soundness far more than it does theoretical or practical simplicity.
In Part III, I return to Dama~ka's agenda, examining the institutional
pillars on which he concentrates. I believe the factors I discuss in Part II,
especially the Anglo-American system's individual rights orientation, help to
explain both much of the common law system of evidence and, to a significant
extent, the institutional pillars themselves. Indeed, I suggest that the institutions
cannot be taken as exogenous, or prior to, the system; on the contrary, if the
institutions do not serve the values expressed in the larger system, they will
tend to change over the long term. Thus, I contend that, although Dama~ka's
perceptions are insightful, he accords somewhat too much weight to the
institutional pillars. Even if the pillars were removed altogether, there would
still be solid grounds-rooted especially in its individual rights orientation-for
much of the Anglo-American law of evidence.
Part IV addresses the prospects for future change that Damagka discusses.
Dama~ka is presumably correct that institutional changes will help to cause
doctrinal changes. But this is neither a recent development, nor one that should
be feared. Indeed, to some extent, evidence law always has been, and always
should be, "adrift"; at the same time, the individual rights orientation of the
common law system has for centuries acted as an anchor for evidentiary and
procedural law. Accordingly, I suspect that the current institutional changes
that Dama~ka addresses will be less drastic and have less impact than Dama~ka
believes. And that is as it should be. Some aspects of evidentiary law
correspond to our deeply held notions of the rights of individuals and are
worth preserving.
I. CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES AS VIEWED FROM WITHOUT
In this part, I analyze two of the features that Dama~ka identifies as
characteristic of the Anglo-American system: its "preoccupation with sifting
the material for the factfinder to hear and see" and its "aspiration to structure
the analysis of evidence."' 9 I agree with him that the Anglo-American system
19. DAMA9KA, supra note 1, at 8. I postpone to other portions of this Review most of my discussion
of the first feature that Damaka identifies, namely, the complexity of regulation. See infra Section III.A.
The aspect of complexity that Damalka finds most significant is what he calls the technical character of
the common law system: its departure from ordinary methods of factual inquiry in social practice. See
DAMAIKA, supra note I, at 11-12. This does indeed seem to be a principal characteristic of the common
law system, and, as Damalka says, it provides one of the recurrent themes of his book. See id.
Another aspect of complexity is the volume of Anglo-American evidentiary law-"the sheer mass of
evidentiary rules." Id. at 8. But Damalka goes to some length to show that "[o]n this dimension, the
contrast between Anglo-American and Continental systems is grossly overstated." Id. While deferring to
Damalka in his description of the Continental system, I believe that the common law system does aspire
to dotrinalize-to articulate in rules-a great deal of evidentiary law and to protect a range of policy goals
1924 [Vol. 107: 1921
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has a strong prophylactic orientation, although I cast that orientation somewhat
differently. I disagree for the most part with his assertion that the common law
system aspires to structure the factfinder's analysis of evidence.
A. Prophylactic Orientation
As Damaka indicates, "Virtually all observers agree that the intense
preliminary screening of evidence constitutes a salient trait of the Anglo-
American factfinding style., 20 Damalka believes that the perceived difference
between systems in this respect is "a gross exaggeration,"2 ' and he shows that
extrinsic evidentiary rules-those "rejecting probative information for the sake
of values unrelated to the pursuit of truth"'-'-are present in the Continental
system as well. Yet, he does not dispel the idea that such rules are generally
more pervasive and significantly stronger, both in consequences and in
probability of gaining compliance, in the common law world than in
Continental Europe. 3
Dama~ka contends that "only a small subset of exclusionary rules is truly
idiomatic to the common law" 2 4-intrinsic rules, "those that reject probative
information ... on the belief that its elimination will enhance the accuracy of
factfinding."' Dama~ka discusses three types of such rules: rules barring
evidence because of its slight probative value; rules barring evidence that
would be overestimated by the factfinder; and rules barring evidence that
would predispose the factfinder to a particular verdict.2 These rules implicate
substantially different issues. Indeed, they are better thought of as separate
considerations that may, taken together, favor exclusion. I believe, contrary to
through that doctrine. This aspiration helps to explain an aspect of complexity that Damatka finds more
salient: the appearance that evidentiary law is *'a maze of disconnected rules, embroidered by exceptions
and followed by exceptions to exceptions." Id. at 10. Damagka concedes that the recent trend toward
codification has greatly reduced this aspect of the common law system. See td.
20. DAMA KA, supra note 1, at 12.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. One example of a Continental exclusionary rule that Damatka cites is testimonial pnvilege, which.
he argues, is broader in some Germanic jurisdictions (but apparently not in Romance jurisdictions) than in
the common law. See id. at 12-13 & n.14. A privilege, however, is different from most exclusionary rules.
It is a right to withhold evidence, in essence preventing its creation; it is not a rule excluding evidence that
a party (or the court) is willing and, without resort to compulsory means, able to present. Dana.Ika also
mentions rules prohibiting the use of illegally obtained evidence, but he acknowledges that these rules are
less stringent in the Continental system than in the American system. See id. at 13-14. Moreover, he doubts
that even those Continental jurisdictions that have formally adopted exclusionary rules will enforce them
vigorously. See id. at 14 n.19. Damaka does not suggest that rules comparable to those exclusionary rules
in the Federal Rules of Evidence that are based very largely on extnnsic policy concerns. see. e.g.. FED.
R. EvID. 407-410 (excluding, inter alia, evidence of subsequent remedial measures, efforts to compromise
a claim, offers to pay medical fees in injury cases, and plea discussions, respectively), are present in any
force in Continental Europe.
24. DAMASKA, supra note 1, at 12.
25. Id. at 14.
26. See id. at 14-17.
1998] 1925
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Dama~ka's view, that two of them are not primarily oriented toward factual
accuracy as such; moreover, the list fails to include one type of rule that is so
oriented.
1. Slight Probative Value
First, Damagka points out correctly that it is daily routine in the common
law to reject evidence on the ground that its probative value is too slight, a
practice virtually unknown in the Continental system.27 If the only downside
of admitting the evidence is wasting time and resources, however, exclusion
is not actually motivated by a desire to improve factual accuracy. Instead, the
need to prevent the parties in an adversarial system from unduly lengthening
trials, especially in a context of overburdened dockets, adequately explains the
common law tendency.
2. Overestimation by the Factfinder
Dama~ka articulates separately, but does not sharply distinguish between,
two other types of rules: those rejecting probative material because its value
might be overestimated by the factfinder and those rejecting probative material
because its value is overshadowed by "its capacity to unfairly predispose the
trier of fact toward a particular outcome. 28
The rule against hearsay is the most prominent of the rules often justified on
the first basis, that is, the fear that the factfinder will overestimate the value of
evidence.29 This fear genuinely seems to stem from a desire to ensure factual
accuracy. But, as Dama~ka points out in another context, the fear is unfounded
in many of the evidentiary contexts in which it arises, including the rule against
hearsay.30 There is no good reason to conclude, as a general matter, that a jury
will overvalue hearsay evidence to such an extent that its admission is more
likely to impede than to assist the truth-determining process. Indeed, as Dama~ka
points out, the empirical evidence that exists on this score points in the other
direction.3' Moreover, concerns regarding juror overestimation of evidence
seem to have become prominent rather late in the history of the common
law-well into the nineteenth century and well after exclusionary rules had taken
27. See id. at 14-15; see also, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403 (providing for exclusion on this ground); David
Crump, On the Uses of Irrelevant Evidence, 34 HoUS. L. REv. 1, 9-20 (1997) (arguing that the definition
of relevance under the Federal Rules of Evidence is extremely broad, and that Rule 403 does not provide
sufficient guidance as to when evidence of minimal probative value should be excluded).
28. DAMAtKA, supra note 1, at 15.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 28-33.
31. See id. at 31 n.10 (citing studies supporting the conclusion that jurors tend to attribute little weight
to hearsay).'
1926 [Vol. 107: 1921
HeinOnline  -- 107 Yale L.J. 1926 1997-1998
1998] Anchors and Flotsam 1927
firm footing.32 Much of the rhetoric of common law discourse concerns the
possibility of overestimation, but it is unlikely that this possibility ever
genuinely provided a ground for broad exclusion of probative material.
3. Bias
The possibility that evidence will bias, or predispose, the factfinder in one
direction-a concern that weighs most heavily with respect to evidence of prior
misconduct33 seems not to be principally concerned with factual accuracy.
One could say that such evidence would create a filter distorting the reception
of other evidence, and this may be the way Damagka views the common law
resistance to evidence of prior misconduct." But this concern is barely
distinguishable from that regarding overestimation, and is subject to the same
skeptical critique. A factfinder who, in trying to determine a person's conduct
on a given occasion, accords substantial probative value to the person's prior
conduct is probably acting perfectly rationally. 35 Indeed, there is no good
reason to believe that such evidence will tend to lead the factfinder away from,
rather than toward, the truth. 3 The real concern is that evidence of this type
will bias the factfinder to resolve doubts in a way that the system deems
inappropriate, or that it will compel the factfinder to issue a knowingly false
finding to punish the disfavored party. In this view, the real reason for
exclusion of this evidence is to protect the standard of persuasion and, to some
32. See Edmund M. Morgan, Foreword to MODEL CODE OF EvIDENCE 1. 36 (1942). In a separate
article, Morgan reviews the long history of the oath requirement. wnting that "Jilt was msisted upon, not
because of any supposed incapacity of the trier to evaluate unswom testimony, but bccause of its effect
upon the mind and emotions of the witness." Edmund M. Morgan. Hearsay Dangers and the Application
of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177, 182 (1948). Furthermore. he states that
[b]efore the opening of the eighteenth century ... we find three reasons advanced for excluding
hearsay. The court and jury must base their findings upon what the witness knows and not upon
what he is credulous enough to believe; the witness must make that knowledge known under
sanction of fear of the consequences which falsehood will bnng; and the adversary must have
an opportunity to cross-examine. There is no suggestion that any one of these is less necessary
where the trier is a court than where there is a jury.
Id. at 182-83.
33. See FED. R. EVtD. 404(a) (excluding, subject to limited exceptions, "[elvidence of a person's
character or a trait of character ... for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a
particular occasion"); id. 404(b) (excluding "[e]vidence of other crimes. wrongs. or acts.., to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith"); id. 608-609 (restricting
impeachment by proof of bad character, specific acts of misconduct, and prior conviction of crime).
DamaKka points out that such exclusion is almost unknown in Continental systems. See DA .%KA. supra
note 1, at 16.
34. Dama~ka speaks of the "distinctive concern of Anglo-Amencan evidence law" that "dirty linen
from a person's past could obscure whatever relevance propensity inferences might possess." DA.",ASKA.
supra note 1, at 17.
35. I have discussed this point at some length with reference to character impeachment. See Richard
Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence: Psycho-Bayesian [. 71 Analysis and a Proposed Overhaul.
38 UCLA L. REv. 637, 645-54, 680-87 (1991).
36. Like Dama.ka, I am acting on the pleasantly naive assumption that there is such a thing as truth
and that we know approximately what it means. For Damagka's helpful comments in this regard. see
DAMASKA, supra note 1, at 94-95.
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extent, the substantive law. Thus, as I contend in Part II, exclusions of this
type are related not to a desire to ensure factual accuracy, but to the common
law system's orientation toward individual rights and its drive for uniformity.
4. The "Best Evidence" Principle
Another kind of rule that is apposite here, and to which Dama~ka adverts
at other points but not in this context, is based on the "best evidence"
principle. This principle provides that, even though introduction of an
evidentiary item would be net beneficial to the truth-determining process,
exclusion might yet be warranted on the ground that it will induce the
proponent to introduce evidence that would be better for that process.37 The
principle provides some support for characteristics of the common law system
such as the rule against hearsay, the preference for original documents, and the
authentication requirement. Because the rationale of the principle is that
exclusion will have a beneficial effect on party behavior, the force of the
principle arises from party domination of the presentation of evidence.
5. Summary
In sum, therefore, the common law evidentiary system does have a strong
prophylactic orientation, as Dama~ka argues. But I see the nature of that
orientation somewhat differently. The common law system is aggressive in
using exclusionary rules both for extrinsic and intrinsic purposes. The principal
intrinsic purposes served by these rules are to save time and resources, to
ensure that factfinders adhere to legal norms, and to induce proponents to
produce better evidence. Dama~ka is correct in arguing that cognitive
disabilities of factfinders are generally a weak basis for exclusion, but I believe
he is mistaken in thinking that this is a principal basis for the common law's
exclusionary rules-that the common law's emphasis on this factor has
generative, rather than merely rhetorical, force. A significant consequence of
this conclusion, as I emphasize in Part IlI, is that the role of the jury as
factfinder provides a relatively small part of the justification for most common
law evidentiary doctrines; many of those doctrines would have much the same
force, however strong or weak that force may be, absent the jury.
B. Structuring the Analysis of Evidence
Dama~ka contends that, despite a general view to the contrary, an
important aspect of the common law system is an aspiration to structure the
37. See id. at 85 n.22. Damaka properly cites Dale Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA L.
REv. 227 (1988), as an important exposition of this idea.
1928 [Vol. 107: 1921
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factfinder's analysis of evidence.3" From my essentially noncomparative
perspective, I do not recognize such a feature of our system. Damaka
concedes that the opacity of the jury verdict-where juries are still the
factfinders-is a powerful factor cutting against him.3 9 So too, for that matter,
is the wide deference paid to factual findings made by judges in bench
trials.4° Moreover, there is much more we could do to structure the jury's
analysis of factual findings that we do not do. Jury instructions offer the best
available means to impose such structure, but they are usually delivered orally
rather than in writing-and often in a monotone, as if to signal the jury not to
take them seriously. We treat the jury room as a black box, disallowing any
impeachment of the jury's decision so long as its proceedings are not tainted
by any improper extrinsic influence, even if jurors acknowledge that they
flagrantly violated their instructions." The jury is usually asked to return an
inarticulate general verdict, even though more specific findings could (at least
in civil trials) be demanded. 2 And courts reviewing a verdict generally strain
to uphold it as long as they can imagine any plausible line of thought that
might have led to it.43 What, then, is the basis for Dama~ka's claim that the
common law aspires to structure the factfinder's reasoning process?
1. Corroboration Rules
Damagka cites corroboration rules-rules providing that one witness's
direct testimony to an event cannot alone prove the event-as an example of
the common law system's aspiration to structure the factfinder's analysis. "[I]n
the absence of the confirmation required by law," Damagka writes, "triers of
fact are not supposed to take a fact as proven no matter how persuaded they
might be that it exists."'  But such rules-which are of rather small
importance today45 -seem to be rules of admissibility or sufficiency rather
38. See DAMASKA, supra note 1, at 17-24.
39. See id. at 17.
40. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) and advisory committee's note to 1985 amendment (providing that
in bench trials, "[flindings of fact ... shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous").
41. See FED. R. EVID. 606(b) and accompanying advisory committee's note (providing. subject to
qualification, that "a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring dunng thc course of the
jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as
influencing the juror to assent or to dissent from the verdict or indictment"). Indeed. the Supreme Court
has declined to allow a verdict to be impeached even by evidence of extensive drug and alcohol use by
jurors during the trial and deliberations. See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987).
42. See FED. R. CIv. P. 49(b).
43. See Lavender v. Kum, 327 U.S. 645, 653 (1946) ("Only when there is a complete absence of
probative facts to support the conclusion reached [by the jury) does a reversible error appear.").
44. DAMASKA, supra note I, at 18.
45. Although Damaka does not cite any currently prevailing corroboration rules, there is a substantial
number of such rules. For example, many American junsdictions require some corroboration for criminal
confessions, but this requirement appears to be rather easily satisfied. See I MCCORuMICK ox EVIDE.CE §
145, at 559-63 (John H. Strong et al. eds., 4th ed. 1992). Some junsdictions require corroboration in actions
alleging recovered memory of child sexual abuse, see Sheila Taub. The Legal Treatmenr of Recovered
Memories of Child Sexual Abuse, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 183, 196, 199-201 (1996). but such actions, while
1998] 1929
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than regulations of the factfinding process. That is, these rules do not tell the
factfinder how to go about determining whether a fact is true; instead, they
determine whether a given item of evidence is admissible or whether the




Similar observations can be made about presumptions, which Dama~ka
mentions in passing.47 A presumption is a rule providing, in effect: "Given
predicate X, then presumed fact Y must be taken as true, unless there is
sufficient evidence of not-Y. ' 48 Presumptions may appear at first to be
intrusions into the middle of the factfinding process. I do not believe, however,
that in fact they impose much structure on juries' analysis of evidence. Rather,
their most significant aspect is their impact on whether a given issue needs to
be decided by the jury at all.49
extraordinarily troubling, are still relatively infrequent, see id. at 185-86. The Constitution requires two
witnesses to the same overt act for proof of treason, see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1, but treason
prosecutions are very rare in the modem day. In addition, until recent times, many jurisdictions required
corroboration for proof of rape. See Richard A. Hibey, The Trial of a Rape Case: An Advocate's Analysis
of Corroboration, Consent, and Character, II AM. CRIM. L. REV. 309, 311 n.8 (1973) (reviewing
examples). Fortunately, that rule has been abrogated in most jurisdictions, see SANFORD H. KADISH &
STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 371 (6th ed. 1995)
(noting that no American state now requires corroboration in forcible rape cases), although it lingered for
far too long. The testimony of children and accomplices also required corroboration until relatively recently.
See COLIN TAPPER, CROSS AND TAPPER ON EvIDENCE 233-34, 247 (8th ed. 1995). Of course,
uncorroborated evidence may often fail to persuade a jury, and lack of corroboration may cause a
prosecution not to be brought. Cf. Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE LJ. 1087, 1091 (1986) ("Corroboration
requirements unique to rape may have been repealed, but they continue to be enforced as a matter of
practice in many jurisdictions."). This, however, is not a matter of evidence law.
46. See FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2) (providing that "[t]he contents of the [offered] statement ... are not
alone sufficient to establish" certain predicates for admissibility under the theory of vicarious admission);
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (providing that "[a] statement tending to expose the declamnt to criminal liability
and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible [under the hearsay exception for statements against
interest] unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement"); I
MCCORMICK, supra note 45, at 562 ("Whether the requirement [of corroboration for confessions) is one
of admissibility, sufficiency of the evidence, or both, it obviously is to be applied in at least the first
instance by the trial judge.").
47. See DAMA KA, supra note I, at 18-19.
48. See 2 McCORMICK, supra note 45, § 342, at 450.
49. The initial burden of production may take the form of a presumption: "Absent sufficient evidence
of A, not-A is presumed." (In this statement, the predicate X in the general form of a presumption stated
in the text comprises all the information the jury is allowed to bring in from the outside world and nothing
else, and it is left implicit.) That is, absent sufficient evidence of A, the court takes not-A as given, and the
issue never reaches the jury.
Thereafter, a presumption might conditionally shift the burden of production, providing: "Given B,
then A must be found unless there is sufficient evidence of not-A." In this form, however, the presumption
is an instruction to the court, not to the jury. If the party opposing A presents sufficient evidence to put A
in substantial doubt, then there is no need to give an instruction based on the presumption at all; the case
should simply go to the jury with instructions to find A or not-A based on all the evidence, which includes
the evidence of B. (This is not so with respect to an irrebuttable presumption, but such a presumption is
really a disguised, and poorly articulated, rule of substantive law. See id. at 451.) If, on the other hand, the
party opposing A has not presented sufficient countering evidence and the party favoring A presents
1930
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3. Instructions To Disregard Evidence
As a further example of the common law's aspiration to structure the
factfinder's analysis, Damaka cites instructions to ignore evidence that has
been heard notwithstanding its inadmissibility) 0 Such instructions, however,
are merely attempts-perhaps hypocritical-to enforce exclusionary rules.5 t
If the evidence should not have been heard but was admitted, and the judge is
determined not to grant a mistrial, then what should she do but ask the jury to
disregard the evidence and hope for the best? Moreover, the Continental
system has a counterpart to this practice: The courts, much like a common law
judge sitting as factfinder, are restrained by fear of reversal from relying on
unacceptable evidence in justifying their findings.5
4. Limited Admissibility
As a final example of the manner in which the common law system
allegedly structures the factfinder's decisions, Dama~ka mentions instructions
of limited admissibility, which tell jurors that they may consider an item of
evidence for one purpose but not for another.53 These instructions do indeed
intrude into the jury's analysis of evidence-if they are taken seriously.
Nevertheless, I do not believe that they represent a strong aspiration to
structure factfinding analysis. For one thing, the nature of these rules suggests
overwhelming proof of B, then the court should give a simple instruction to take A as givcn-or, if A is
dispositive of the case, the court need not submit the case to the jury at all.
Only if there is sufficient, but not indisputable, proof of B and insubstantial evidence of not-A does
the presumption yield an instruction to the jury, in the form "If you find B. you must find A.- an instruction
that might be thought to structure the jury's factfinding. Even in this context, however, the instruction is.
in effect, more a statement of what the jury's task is than an attempt to structure how it achieves that task;
it amounts to a statement that, rather than having to determine whether A is true. the jury should determine
whether A or B is true. Moreover, presumptions most often are based on probability. i.e.. on the perception
that the presumed fact A most likely follows from the premise B. See id. at 454-55. Thus. an instruction
to find A given B usually tells the jurors to do what they would have done anyway. In fact. it is likely that
when courts instruct juries in the language of presumptions, they often mean (notwithstanding the
mandatory language) not to require that the jurors find the presumed fact if they find the predicate fact.
but only to remind them that they may infer the presumed fact if they are so persuaded. My speculation
on this point is based largely on the fact that courts do not make stnngent efforts to ensure that juries
follow presumptions.
50. See DAMAtKA, supra note I, at 18.
51. Research yields mixed, often discouraging results on the effects of instructions to disregard. See
Saul M. Kassin & Christina A. Studebaker, Instrutcnons To Disregard and the Jury: Curative and
Paradoxical Effects, in INTENTIONAL FORGETTING: INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACMES 414. 422 (Jonathan
M. Golding & Colin M. MacLeod eds., 1998): see also infra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing
the well-known ineffectiveness of some limiting instructions).
52. See DAMAtKA, supra note I, at 17-18.
53. I have discussed the idea of limited admissibility at some length elsewhere. See Richard D.
Friedman, General Editor's Introduction to DAVID P. LEONARD, THE NEW WIGiOR_: A TREATISE ON
EVIDENCE at xxxv, xxxv-xlii (Richard D. Friedman ed., 1996). For a thorough exploration of limited
admissibility, see LEONARD, supra, §§ 1.1 to 1.112.
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that any such structuring is an effect rather than a motive: These are generally
rules of limited inadmissibility, holding that the costs of admissibility outweigh
the benefits with regard to certain propositions but recognizing that the
evidence might be helpful to truth determination with regard to other
propositions.5 4 Limited admissibility instructions thus reflect an unwillingness
to be confined to two unpalatable choices: unduly restricting the information
available to the factfinder, on the one hand, or abandoning altogether the
impulse behind the exclusionary rule, on the other.
Moreover, as with presumptions, the most substantial impact of rules of
limited admissibility may not be on the jury at all. Indeed, jurors often fail to
follow instructions limiting the use to which they may put evidence presented
to them.5" That does not mean that rules-as opposed to instructions-of
limited admissibility are inconsequential, however. Precisely because juries will
likely ignore an instruction to consider evidence with respect to one defendant
but not with respect to another, such rules may be critical in determining
whether a case involving multiple defendants must be tried by multiple juries
rather than by a single one.56 And, probably most significantly, such rules are
sometimes important in determining whether a case goes to the jury at all: If
Porter's prior statement identifying Green as his drug supplier is admitted to
impeach Porter's denial from the witness stand that he remembers who his
supplier was but not to prove that Green was the supplier,57 there may be
insufficient proof of Green's guilt for the case to reach the jury. In short, the
concept of limited admissibility has a significant potential impact on the shape
and result of litigation, but only a slight and uncertain one on how a jury deals
with the evidence actually presented to it.
54. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee's note ("Exclusion is called for only when the
evidence of subsequent remedial measures is offered as proof of negligence or culpable conduct."); see
also, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 408 advisory committee's note ("Since the rule excludes only when the purpose
is proving the validity or invalidity of the claim or its amount, an offer for another purpose is not within
the rule.").
55. Note the well-known statement of Justice Jackson: "The naive assumption that prejudicial effects
can be overcome by instructions to the jury all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction."
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (citations omitted); see
also, e.g., Sarah Tanford et al., Decision Making in Joined Criminal Trials: The Influence of Charge
Similarity, Evidence Similarity, and Limiting Instructions, 9 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 319 (1985) (reporting,
as the result of a mock juror study, the limited success of limiting instructions in reducing excess conviction
rates attributable to joinder of similar charges); Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy
of Limiting Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence To Decide on Guilt, 9 LAW & HUM.
BEHAv. 37 (1985) (finding that mock jurors improperly used prior conviction evidence despite instructions).
56. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (holding that a limiting instruction inadequately
protected the defendant against prejudice created by the confession of the codefendant that was admissible
only against the codefendant).
57. I have in mind the factual setting, but not the outcome, in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 151-
53, 170 (1970).
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5. Conditional Relevance
At least one other type of rule, not mentioned by Damagka, can reflect an
intervention in the factfinder's analytical process. This is the rule of conditional
relevance. As classically conceived, the rule provides that if the relevance of
evidence A depends on whether proposition B is true, A should be admitted only
upon or subject to "the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding"
of B.58 In practice, however, the intrusion posed by the rule of conditional
relevance is not substantial, 59 and in any event the intrusion could (and should)
be minimized without fundamentally altering the common law system.6
6. Summary
In sum, therefore, Damaka's claim that the common law evidence system
58. FED. R. EvID. 104(b). In some statements of the rule. the court must not only determine whether
the jury could find the preliminary fact, but it must also ask the jury to determine the truth of that fact. See.
e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 403 assembly committee's note (West 1995) ("ITlhe jury must finally decide
whether the preliminary fact exists."); EDMUND M. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEtS OF EVIDENCE 43 (1954)
(stating, in reference to the situation in which two proposittons are mutually dependent on each other for
relevance, that "the jury should determine the dispute as to each under proper instructions from the judge-):
cf. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988) (speaking of "the requisite finding" of the
preliminary fact). The Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Evidence cited both the Califomia
statute and Morgan's book in explaining Rule 104(b). See FED. R. EVID. § 104(b) advisory committee's
note.
59. The rule is not usually applied in the strong version, discussed supra note 49. More often. it seems,
courts purport merely to determine whether the jury could find the predicate fact B to be true; if it could.
the courts admit evidence A along with the evidence bearing on B without imposing a restrictive instruction.
See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988) ("'he court simply examines all the evidence
in the case and decides whether the jury could reasonably find the conditional fact .. .by a preponderance
of the evidence.").
60. This is the principal point of one of my previous articles. See Richard D. Friedman, Condsitonal
Probative Value: Neoclassicism Without Myth, 93 MICH. L. REv. 439 (1994) [hereinafter Friedman.
Conditional Probative Value]. For subsequent discussion, see Peter Tillers, Exaggerated and Misleading
Reports of the Death of Conditional Relevance, 93 MICH. L REv. 478 (1994); Dale A. Nance. Conditional
Probative Value and the Reconstruction of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 94 MICH. L. REv. 419 (1995);
and Richard D. Friedman, Refining Conditional Probative Value, 94 MICH. L. REv. 457 (1995) [hereinafter
Friedman, Refining Conditional Probative Value].
There is one way in which the classical conception does restrict the factfinding process artificially-
Sometimes, it excludes evidence A absent sufficient proof to support a finding of B although A has
considerable probative value (so long as B is a plausible possibility) even absent such proof. See Friedman.
Conditional Probative Value, supra, at 445-53. (In this earlier article. I described the restmction as an
"intrusion," id. at 445; if, however, the conditional relevance rule is applied in the more moderate form
described above, it does not intrude in the sense I am using that term here. That is. the rule may cause the
exclusion of evidence and so restrict the jury's factfinding. but it does not structure the jury's analysis of
the evidence presented to it.) The problem might be more one of theoretical neatness than of practical
consequence. The right result is to admit evidence A-whether or not the jury could find B more likely true
than not-if, given all the circumstances, A has sufficient probative value to warrant admission. I believe
courts generally reach this result without regard to the prevailing theory. See id. at 448-51. An exception
might be in the area of authentication, where it seems that courts have sometimes been too demanding in
requiring affirmative evidence. See, e.g., 2 MCCORMICK. supra note 45. § 218. at 37 ("[Tjhe purported
signature or recital of authorship on the face of a writing will not be accepted as sufficient preliminary
proof of authenticity .... ). Even in this context, however, courts have usually applied the more moderate
form of the conditional relevance principle; that is. they have not demanded a separate finding by the jury
regarding authenticity.
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is marked by a "pronounced aspiration ... to structure the factfinders' analysis
of evidence ' '61 is unpersuasive. Instead, the system pays great attention to the
question of whether the evidence is sufficient for the factfinder to make a
particular type of decision; if it is, the factfinder is left remarkably free.
Dama~ka, in my view, pays too little attention to this matter of sufficiency.
62
The need to determine sufficiency is related to the common law's separation
of judge and jury, but I think it is related also to the common law style of
attempting to determine many issues as a matter of law so as to be
generalizable to many cases.
H. THE SYSTEM AS SEEN FROM WITHIN
Dama~ka's description of the Anglo-American evidentiary system leaves
out, or at least underemphasizes, three significant features. This part will
describe those features and begin to discuss how they explain a great deal
about the system. Most important among these features is an emphasis on
individual rights. Second is a tendency to treat evidentiary matters in a
legalistic way, with an aspiration toward uniformity. Third is a rationalist
intellectual framework centering on a frank recognition of uncertainty in
factfinding and oriented toward structures that are analytically sound even
though theoretically and practically very complex. These three features are
interrelated. The rights orientation tends to frame evidentiary issues as matters
that should be resolved by law in as uniform a way as possible; conversely,
legalistic treatment can lead a party to claim a right to a given evidentiary
result. An emphasis on legalistic treatment also leads to the probing style that
is characteristic of the rationalist approach.
In this part, I make some comparisons between Anglo-American and
Continental evidentiary law, but my claim is not principally comparative.
Instead, I attempt to describe significant features of the common law system.
I suspect these features are not as strong in the Continental system, but I do
not try seriously to prove the point. If I am wrong about that, so be it. I do not
believe my essential points will be undercut.
A. Free People of Heart and with Tongue: Individual Rights and the Common
Law Evidentiary System
From my perspective, the dominant feature of the common law evidentiary
system is its grounding in rights of the individual, especially the parties to the
litigation. Some rights of parties and nonparties in the Continental system, one
61. DAMA9KA, supra note I, at 24.
62. See infra Section II.C; infra Subsection III.A.4.
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learns from Damaka, are absent from or weaker in the common law
system. 63 On the whole, however, I believe that a conception of individual
rights-albeit rights that are often ill-defined and often in tension with one
another-is far stronger and more pervasive in the common law than in the
Continental system. Indeed, the institutional pillars that Damaka analyzes--the
divided trial court, compressed trials, and above all the adversary
system-emerged largely from this conception. Thus, DamaAka may put
matters backwards when he states that "several aspects of the adversary
factfinding style have been shored up by elevation to the status of a
constitutional mandate."'  The constitutional mandates-already quite old in
the United States-exist because they reflect significant rights that should be
diminished only with great caution.
Before discussing how the common law's individual rights orientation
affects the system's evidentiary law, I sketch some historical background to
that orientation.
1. Historical Background
For centuries, observers in both England and Continental Europe have
noted that the English were a freer and more individualistic people than the
Europeans.65 There is enormous historical debate over whether this disparity
was real or merely perceived, when it developed, and what the causes were.66
63. Damagka mentions testimonial privileges of witnesses. which are sometimes broader in the
Continental system than in common law countries. See DAMA;KA. supra note I. at 12-13. Privileges are,
in a sense, the shadow of other rights, in that they limit the right of litigants (often the adversary of the
privilege holder) to gather and present evidence. Damaka also suggests that Continental courts are more
likely than their Anglo-American counterparts to accord litigants a right to present evidence notwithstanding
the tardiness of the offer. See id. at 67 & n.16.
64. Id. at 134-35. Damaka cites dicta in Strickland v Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984). and
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990). to make this point. See DAMASKA. Supra note I. at 135 n. 17. But
neither Strickland nor Craig, which dealt respectively with the right to counsel and the right of
confrontation, expanded defendants' rights. Indeed, in both cases, the Court held against the defendant.
65. This paragraph and some of the succeeding discussion are drawn largely from ALAN
MACFARLANE, THE ORIGINS OF ENGLISH INDIVIDUALISM: THE FAMILY, PROPERTY. AND SOCIAL
TRANSMON (1978) [hereinafter MACFARLANE, ORIGINS OF ENGLISH INDIVIDUALISM). especially the
Introduction and Chapter 7, "England in Perspective." Although Macfarlane's book is controversial. it has
"become a classic." Paul Helas, Introduction to ALAN MACFARLANE. ON INDIVIDUALISM at 1. 1 (1994). i
am persuaded by Macfarlane's main argument, which supports the view that the English are (and have
been) more individualistic, but in any event my own argument does not depend on the full reach of his;
for my purpose, the perception of English individualism is more important than the reality. For another
treatment of the phenomenon of English individualism, see. for example. C.B. MACPHERSON. THE
POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM at vii. 3 (1962). which develops a theory that "English
political thought from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries had an underlying unity." based on a
"conception of the individual as essentially the proprietor of his own person or capacities, owing nothing
to society for them."
66. England's different landholding system, which made private rights fuller and transferability easter.
its greater diffusion, geographically and demographically, of wealth and education, and its absence of a
caste system; its lack of an absolute monarchy, a strong bureaucracy, high taxes, or marauding armies; its
longstanding prosperity; its style of family upbringing and its apprenticeship system, which tended to
deemphasize the family as a governing unit; the general "orneriness" of the English; and. beginning with
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But in any event, there is little doubt that such disparities were commonly
perceived as early as the thirteenth century, that they were unquestionable by
the sixteenth century, and that the legal system was at their heart. In the
middle of the thirteenth century, for example, the celebrated encyclopedist
Bartholomaeus Anglicus described his fellow Englishmen as "free men of herte
and with tongue. ' 67 By that time, the English legal system had "evolved into
one of individual rights and ownership. '68 The English repeatedly praised
their legal system in comparison to the Roman-canonic system that prevailed
on the Continent. Particularly celebrated examples of such praise are John
Fortescue's paean, De Laudibus Legum Anglie (In Praise of the Laws of
England),69 written around 1470 in the form of a dialogue with a fictitious
prince explaining the superiority of the English legal system, and its successor
essay, The Governance of England. 70 Fortescue wrote unfavorably about the
French system, where all law emanated from an absolute monarch and the
people were mere subjects; by contrast, he saw England as a limited monarchy
based on the voluntary acquiescence of the people, an association of free men
held together by mutual contracts for self-protection. 7I The less hierarchical
English social structure made possible a system of adjudication that depended
on juries," a system that Fortescue praised for its openness and
confrontational nature.73 This emphasis was echoed through the centuries by
numerous English commentators.74 By the seventeenth century, when phrases
the Reformation, religion-all these, along with the legal system, were part of a web of cause and effect
that formed a distinctive picture of English individualism. See MACFARLANE, ORIGINS O1 ENGLISH
INDIVIDUALISM, supra note 65, at 2-5, 175-88.
67. 2 BARTHOLOMAEUS ANGLICUS, ON THE PROPERTIES OF THINGS: JOHN TREVISA'S TRANSLATION
OF BARTHOLOMAEUS ANGLICUS DE PROPRIErATIBUS RERUM 734 (John Trevisa trans., Oxford Univ. Press
1975).
68. MACFARLANE, ORIGINS OF ENGLISH INDIVIDUALISM, supra note 65, at 188. This is Macfarlane's
characterization, drawn in part from the work of Henry Maine. See HENRY SUMNER MAINE, DISSERTATIONS
ON EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM 323 (London, John Murray 1891) ("[F]rom very early times landed property
changed hands by purchase and sale more frequently in England than elsewhere."); id. at 341-47 (detailing
the development of the conception of individually held land); id. at 355 (discussing "liberty of transfer and
devise").
69. SIR JOHN FORTESCUE, In Praise of the Laws of England, in ON THE LAWS AND GOVERNANCE OF
ENGLAND 40 (Shelley Lockwood ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (c. 1470).
70. SIR JOHN FORT CUF, The Governance of England, in ON THE LAWS AND GOVERNANCE OF
ENGLAND, supra note 69, at 83.
71. See id. at 83-90. Macfarlane points out the similarity between Fortescue's view and that expressed
two hundred years later by Thomas Hobbes. See MACFARLANE, ORIGINS OF ENGLISH INDIVIDUALISM, supra
note 65, at 180 n.68.
72. See FORTESCUE, supra note 69, at 43; see also MACFARLANE, ORIGINS OF ENGLISH
INDIVIDUALISM, supra note 65, at 181 (summarizing Fortescue's argument on the relationship between
English social structure and the use of juries). Fortescue's observations on social structure were consistent
with those made centuries later by Alexis de Tocqueville. See MACFARLANE, ORIGINS OF ENGLISH
INDIVIDUALISM, supra note 65, at 181-82 (comparing Fortescue's observations with Tocqueville's).
73. See FORTESCUE, supra note 69, at 38-41.
74. See, e.g., La Case del Union d'Escose ove Angleterre, 72 Eng. Rep. 908, 913 (K.B. 1606);
MATTHEW HALE, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 163-64 (Charles M. Gray ed., University of Chicago
Press 1971) (c. 1670); THOMAS SMrrH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM 114-15 (Mary Dewar ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1982) (c. 1565); S. Emlyn, Preface to STATE TRIALS at xxii (Sollyn Emlyn ed., 2d ed. 1730).
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like "an Englishman's birthright" had become commonplace,"5 the English
tended to regard the common law as being as old as their history, as natural
as the air.76 Visitors from the Continent had a similar view. After a visit in
1729, Montesquieu emphasized his perception that the English were a "free
people" in a nation "passionately fond of liberty," the "[o]ne nation ... in the
world that has for the direct end of its constitution political liberty."" The
perception persisted even after the French Revolution; Alexis de Tocqueville
emphasized the castelessness of English society-a characteristic that, he
noted, had passed to America-and he believed that the spirit animating
English law, protection of individual rights and liberties, was responsible in
significant part for the prosperity and stability of English life. 78
This strong and enduring sense of individualism, of personal right, and of
the role of the legal system as its protector, has had a profound impact on the
common law's procedural and evidentiary system. I turn now to a discussion
of that impact.
2. Individual Rights Orientation in the Common Law Evidentiary System
In 1992, Damaka and I were both members of a delegation of Western
legal scholars that visited Latvia to advise elements of the Latvian government
and legal establishment on what kind of legal system they might create for
their newly emerged state. It turned out that very little of the Anglo-American
system held much interest for them; they regarded it as rather bizarre. But they
were interested in the possibility of jury trials, at least for serious crimes.
Significantly, their interest was based not on the merits of collective
decisionmaking, but on a consideration that, at least in earlier times, made the
common law jury a passionately defended institution: the perception that the
jury stands as a bulwark against oppression by the state operating through
judges who are its agents.79 That consideration may appear less pressing in
75. See, e.g., JOHN LILBURNE & RICHARD OVERTON. ENGLANDS BIRTH RIGHT JUSTIFIED AGAINST
ALL ARBITRARY USURPATION (n.p. 1645).
76. See MACFARLANE, ORIGINS OF ENGLISH INDIVIDUALISM, supra note 65. at 184.
77. 1 CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONrESQUIEU. THE SPIRIT OF TilE LAWS 181. 365. 368
(Thomas Nugent trans., D. Appleton & Co. 1900) (1748).
78. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE. L'ANCIEN REGIME 88-90. 104-05. 184-85 (MW Patterson trans.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1933) (1856); see also SEYMOUR DRESCHER. TOCQUEVILLE AND ENGLAND 198-200
(1964) (describing Tocqueville's view of England's liberty as an essential ideological weapon against the
French Revolution, and noting that England. "as the harbinger of the modem age ... stood as an example
to France of the proper limits of the revolutionary impulse, an impulse which stopped short of dictatorship.
antireligious sentiments, and attacks on individual rights, especially property rights"). Drescher provides
a detailed account of the role of England in Tocqueville's thought, a place that Tocqueville satd had
become "intellectually [his] second country." DRESCHER. supra. at vii.
79. Cf. DAMAtKA, supra note 1, at 28 n.5 ("Only in a few countnes struggling to establish a post-
totalitarian administration of justice does the criminal jury still hold an allure."); id. at 120 (contrasting
"civil-service judges" and "ordinary citizens enlisted in jury service"): H.H. Jescheck. Germany., in T1HE
ACCUSED: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 246. 251-52 (J.A. Courts ed.. 1966) (noting that in England the jury
is looked upon as a bulwark safeguarding the freedom of the defendant, while Germans tend to believe that
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modem common law countries, where we are less likely than we once were
to regard judges as imposed from above, but it should not be forgotten in
evaluating the merits of the jury.
Other procedural aspects of the common law system have a strong
foundation in notions of individual rights. The right to counsel, of course, is
one (although it did not become well-founded in most criminal cases until the
eighteenth century, 0 which is later than one might think). So too are the
presumption of innocence, together with the high standard of persuasion
necessary for conviction of a crime,8' and the privilege against self-
incrimination.
8 2
Even more fundamental to the common law system, especially in criminal
trials, is the right to confront adverse witnesses, with their testimony taken
subject to punishment for false statement. This right has roots of very long
standing within the common law system and has had a critical impact on the
modem law of hearsay.8 3 By the middle of the sixteenth century-long before
the advent of the criminal defense lawyer-a confrontational view of the trial
as an "altercation" had developed.84 Treason defendants' persistent demands
that they be brought "face to face" with their accusers85 found recurrent
a mixed tribunal protects individuals equally well).
80. See John H. Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A View from the Ryder
Sources, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1197 (1996).
81. For helpful discussions of the 17th-century intellectual climate in which the reasonable doubt
standard developed, see HENRY G. VAN LEEUWEN, THE PROBLEM OF CERTAINTY IN ENGLISH THOUGHT,
1630-1690, at xiii (1963); and BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND PROBABLE CAUSE
7 (1991).
82. The history of this privilege is a matter of considerable controversy. See generally R.H. HELM HOLZ
ET AL., THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT (1997). Although
there was such a privilege on the Continent, it seems to have been relatively weak. See R.H. Helmholz, The
Privilege and the lus Commune: The Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century, in HELMHOLz ET AL., supra,
at 17, 46. Professor Langbein has argued powerfully that there could be no effective privilege against self-
incrimination at trial so long as the "accused speaks" model of trial, in which criminal defense lawyers
were absent, prevailed. See John H. Langbein, The Privilege and Common Law Criminal Procedure: The
Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries, in HELMHOLZ ET AL., supra, at 82, 108. But the privilege, as
understood at the time it was incorporated into the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, "was not intended
to afford criminal defendants a right to refuse to respond to incriminating questions ... [but] simply to
prohibit improper methods of interrogation." Albert N. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical
Perspective, in HELMHOLZ ET AL., supra, at 181, 184-85; see also M.R.T. Macnair, The Early Development
of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 10 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 66 (1990) (arguing that before
approximately 1688, the privilege was applied to witnesses and to allegations of crime made in civil
proceedings, but did not give a criminal defendant the right to remain silent at trial, and that this earlier
conception was attributable largely to Continental and canon law). Langbein has shown that torture did
occur in England prior to 1640, see JOHN H. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF: EUROPE AND
ENGLAND IN THE ANCIEN REGIME 81-128, 135-36 (1977), but its use there was less frequent, more
contentious, and of a shorter duration than on the Continent, see id. at 9, 77-78, 129-39.
83. I am currently engaged with the English legal historian Michael Macnair in a historical project in
which, among other things, we attempt to prove this claim.
84. See SMITH, supra note 74, at 114.
85. E.g., Duke of Somerset's Trial, I Howell's State Trials 515, 520 (1551); Seymour's Case, I
Howell's State Trials 483, 492 (1549); R. v. Rice ap Griffith (1531), in THE REPORTS OF SIR JOHN
SPELMAN, reprinted in 93 SELDON SOCIETY 47, 48 (J.H. Baker ed., 1977) (stating that the witness James
ap Powel (an accomplice) "avowa toutz lour actz facie ad faciem" (avowed all their acts face to face)).
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support in acts of Parliament. 6 English legal commentators consistently
compared favorably this open method of taking testimony with the Continental
style of taking "written depositions in a corner," out of the presence of the
parties.8 7 Though the confrontation right has roots long antedating the
common law system,88 it is perhaps the right most characteristic of that
system, preserving the individual party's ability to examine adverse witnesses
face to face rather than relying on the efforts of a supposedly neutral judiciary.
I do not mean, of course, to suggest that the rule against hearsay as we
know it should be preserved; on the contrary, I believe it is in need of a major
revamping and unnecessarily excludes much useful evidence. 9 I do mean to
suggest that, at the core of the hearsay rule, and underlying the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment,90 is a right that is very much worth
preserving: the right of a criminal defendant to confront and cross-examine the
maker of a testimonial statement, whether or not that statement was made at
trial.9t That right is an anchor of our system, not a bit of flotsam released by
one of its decaying institutions.
Other significant exclusionary rules also find a substantial part of their
support in the individual rights orientation of the common law. One is the set
of privileges against intrusion into intimate relationships. 9 Another is the set
86. See, e.g., An Acte whereby certayne Offences bee made Treason. 13 EliL. ch. I, § 9 (1571); An
Acte whereby certayne Offences bee made Treason, I Eliz.. ch. 5, § 10 (1558-1559); An Acte restonng
to the Crowne thafilcyent Jurisdiction over the State Ecclesiasticall and Spuall, and abolyshing all Forrenme
Power repugnaunt to the same, I Eliz., ch. 1. § 21 (1558-1559); An Acre whereby certaync Offences bee
made Treasons; and aslo for the Governement of the Kinges and Quenes Majesties Issue, I & 2 Phil. &
M., ch. 10, § 11 (1554-1555); An Acte for the punyshment of div'se Treasons, 5 & 6 Edw. 6. ch. II. §
9 (1552). With respect to requiring an oath from an adverse witness, note WILLIAM LAMBIARDE
EIRENARCHA OR THE OFFICE OF JUSTICES OF PEACE 210 (P.R. Glazcnbrook ed.. Professional Books lUd.
1972) (1581-1582), a manual for justices of the peace, which recommends that statutorily required
examinations of accusing witnesses be taken under oath so that they could be used as testimony if the
witness died before trial. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME IN TilE RENAISSANCE 27 (1974).
87. See, e.g., Le Case del Union d'Escose ove Angleterre. 72 Eng. Rep. 908. 913 (K.B. 1606); see
also Emlyn, supra note 74, at iii-iv. Emlyn states:
The Excellency ... of our Laws ... I take to consist chiefly in that part of them. whtch regards
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS .... In other Countries... the Witnesses are examm'd in pnvate.
and in the Prisoner's Absence; with us they are produced face to face, and deliver their Evidence
in open Court, the Prisoner himself being present, and at liberty to cross-examine them ....
Id.
88. See, e.g., Acts 25:16 ("It is not the manner of the Romans to deliver any man to di,. before he
who is accused have the accusers face to face, and have opportunity to answer for himself concerning the
accusation laid against him.").
89. See Richard D. Friedman, Toward a Partial Economic. Game-Theoretic Analysis of Hearsay. 76
MINN. L. REv. 723, 753-63 (1992).
90. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the nght ... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him ....").
91. I am making a further effort to explore the nature of that right in two forthcoming articles. See
Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles. 86 GEO. L.. (forthcoming Feb.
1998); Richard D. Friedman, Truth and Its Rivals in the Law of Hearsay and Confrontation. 49 HASINGS
L.J. (forthcoming Mar. 1998).
92. I include in this category the right of one spouse not to testify against the other, and the privileges
concerning confidential communications between a person and his or her spouse, physician, or
psychotherapist. A related category may be the rape shield rules, see. e.g.. FED. R. EViD. 412. which are
based at least in significant part on a privacy right of the rape complainant. I do not include the attorney-
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of rules restricting evidence of prior misconduct and character of a person.93
As I argue later,94 in part on grounds similar to those offered by Dama~ka,
these rules are not founded on the supposed cognitive inabilities of the
factfinder. But they do have a firm basis in protecting the criminal defendant,
the usual target of this type of evidence: Exclusionary rules of these kinds
offer some assurance that the defendant will be tried for what he is accused of
doing in the case at bar, not for being a bad person or for having acted badly
in the past.95 Finally, the common law system protects the parties' affirmative
right to present their case.96 The Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth
Amendment and the notion that a party is entitled to "every person's
evidence" 97 are manifestations of this right. So, too, is the ability of the
party's legal representative to meet with those witnesses who are willing to
talk with her.98
Neither the sources nor the boundaries of these rights are clear, and in
some cases their very validity may be doubtful. Often, too, they are in tension
client privilege here because I believe it is justified, not on intimacy grounds, but on a desire not to impcdc
communication between the attorney and the client. The area of intimacy-based privileges may, as Damalka
suggests, be one in which individuals' rights under some Continental systems exceed those under common
law. See DAMA8KA, supra note 1, at 12-13; see also supra note 63.
93. See FED. R. EVID. 404, 405, 608, 609.
94. See infra Subsection III.A.I.
95. I have argued elsewhere that the restriction on character impeachment of a criminal defendant
ought to be made far more substantial. See Friedman, supra note 35.
96. See, e.g., Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (holding that a statute prohibiting persons
charged or convicted as participants in the same crime from testifying for each other violates the Sixth
Amendment compulsory process right); see also infra note 215 and accompanying text.
As Damalka points out, it was not until relatively late that parties in common law proceedings were
allowed to testify under oath. See DAMA9KA, supra note 1, at 117 n.82. I am not quite sure why this
strange situation was allowed to persist for so long. The presumption of innocence in criminal trials may
have had a role, as may have the prevalence, at least before the advent of defense lawyers, of the "accused
speaks" mode of trial. Perhaps most important was a style that treated defective information from various
sources-such as the testimony of those unwilling to take an oath-as "not evidence." For a helpful account
of the demise of this disqualification, see C.J.W. ALLEN, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN VICTORIAN ENaLAND
96-180 (1997).
97. The most commonly quoted expression of this maxim is probably Wigmore's assertion, closely
paraphrasing statements made in a 1742 debate in the House of Lords, that "the public ... has a right to
every man's evidence." 8 J. WIGMogE, EVIDENCE § 2192, at 70 (McNaughton rev. 1961). The principle
clearly applies to, and the maxim is quoted in favor of, individual litigants as well as prosecutors and grand
juries. See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1928 & n.8 (1996) (invoking and reciting the history
of "the familiar expression 'every man's evidence"'); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980)
(citing this "fundamental principle" in limiting the privilege against adverse spousal testimony); United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709-11 (1974) (citing this "ancient proposition of law" in rejecting a claim
of executive privilege); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972) (holding that this "longstanding
principle.., is particularly applicable to grand jury proceedings"); Shannon v. Hansen, 469 N.W.2d 412,
415 (Iowa 1991) (noting "the fundamental principle that ordinarily a private litigant is entitled to discover
and use every person's evidence"); LEONARD MACNALLY, THE RULES OF EVIDENCE ON PLEAS OF TIlE
CROWN 255 (London, J. Butterworth 1802) ("It [is] the undoubted legal constitutional right of every subject
of the realm, who has a cause depending, to call upon a fellow subject to testify what he may know of the
matters in issue; and every man is bound to make the discovery, unless specially exempted and protected
by law." (reporting a decision of the Irish Court of Chancery, per the Master of the Rolls, in an 1802 case
called Butler v. Moore)).
98. See, e.g., FREDERIC T. HORNE, CORDERY's LAW RELATING TO SOLICITORS 273 (8th ed. 1988) ("A
solicitor may interview and take proofs from any prospective witness at any time during the proceedings.").
1940
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with each other: The right of a party to present a relatively uncluttered case
may conflict with her adversary's right to timely and extensive cross-
examination; 99 the right of a rape defendant to confront the accusing witness
collides with the victim's right to withhold on privacy grounds possibly
probative information about her past. But this simply reinforces my essential
point. Concepts of individual rights, as well as claims and discourse about
them, permeate the common law evidentiary system, especially in criminal
cases. And such claims are particularly strong in the United States-a nation
that at its founding declared the importance of inherent and inalienable
rights ' 0 and that very early enshrined an extensive set of litigation rights in
its Constitution.
B. The Rule of Law and the Search for Uniformity
It is impossible to codify the law of evidence fully. In part, this is because,
as Damaka puts it with characteristic verve, "the probative weight of evidence
is a matter too unruly to obey the lawgiver's rein, too contextual to be cap-
tured in a web of categorical legal norms."'' Thus, vast realms of
evidentiary decisionmaking must be left to the event, to be decided without
much constraint by previously articulated rules.1 2 Not all aspects of evidence
must inevitably be treated in this manner, however. Indeed, a salient aspect of
the Anglo-American evidentiary system is its (often vain) aspiration to legalize
evidentiary decisionmaking, to make of it a body of rules capable of
reasonably uniform application. Although I hesitate to make comparative
statements, it appears that this aspiration is far less pronounced in Continental
systems.33
An important source of the Anglo-American aspiration to uniformity is the
rights orientation that I discussed in the previous section. If the admission of
99. See FED. R. EvID. 611(b) advisory committee's note (recognizing the ment of the proposition that
a "practice of limited cross-examination promotes orderly presentation of the case." but concluding that the
matter cannot be well resolved by a general rule).
100. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (declaring that "all men .. are
endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights").
101. DAMAKA, supra note 1, at 20.
102. As Damagka writes, "Case law on matters of evidence is almost always fact-bound and often in
the form of soft-edged rules or balancing tests that can be approximated with little exaggeration to
guidelines, or rules of thumb." Id. at 9. The most important example is the constellation of principles
expressed in the rule governing the exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice. confusion, or
waste of time. See FED. R. EvID. 403.
103. Damagka contends that, although decisions of higher courts in the Continental system are not
formally binding, they do effectively constrain lower court judges. See DAMA.KA. supra note 1. at 8-9. He
also argues that Continental higher courts tend to speak in "rule-like pronouncements" that cannot easily
be evaded by fine factual distinctions. Id. at 10. He also states, however, that "rule-like pronouncements
on some aspects of evidence seldom crystallize." Id. at 10 n.7. Furthermore. Continental systems do not
maintain the apparatuses that one would expect of a system in which uniformity was a priority. See id. at
8 n.2 (referring to "the highly selective reporting of judicial decisions in Continental countries generally");
id. at 9 (describing "the meager harvest of the search" for Continental legislation on evidentiary issues).
1998]
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hearsay or of prior misconduct is thought to violate the rights of a party in
some situations, then it becomes important to try to articulate just what those
situations are. The case is similar with the standard of persuasion: The standard
reflects the social utilities attached to the various possible outcomes, accurate
and inaccurate, with the very high standard of persuasion required in a criminal
prosecution premised principally on the perception that an inaccurate outcome
favoring the prosecution is a dreadful result.1t 4 To a student of the common
law, it would be a strange result to allow the standard to waffle from one case
to another, depending on the decisionmakers in the particular cases. 105
Another source of the aspiration toward uniformity may be the desire to
implement broad policy considerations through evidentiary rulings. I will
consider two types of rules that reflect this idea in that they sacrifice some
probability of accuracy in the case at hand in order to protect some other goal
over the long term. First, an evidentiary rule may attempt to give future parties
security so that they can act in a way the law deems desirable without creating
adverse evidence. Uniformity of exclusion is important if the rule's policy
goals are to be accomplished, for otherwise the rule will not give future parties
the necessary security. For better or worse, this appears to be the principal
basis for the rules excluding evidence, even if it is probative, of subsequent
remedial measures,te 6 settlement offers, 1' 7 and the like (none of which, so
far as I am aware, is present in the Continental system), 0 8 as well as for the
attorney-client privilege.
Additionally, uniformity of exclusion may be justified in some cases
because, without it, the factfinder is likely to use the evidence in ways that
tend toward accurate results in the case at hand but that disregard longer-term
goals of the legal system. I have in mind again evidence of prior misconduct.
As I indicated above,'t 9 a factfinder who gives weight to evidence of prior
misconduct in assessing the accused's conduct on the occasion in question may
well be acting perfectly rationally. But it requires no assumption of cognitive
or emotional frailty to suppose that receipt of this type of evidence will make
the factfinder more eager to punish the accused than the law deems
appropriate, effectively applying a lower standard of persuasion and perhaps
104. See Richard D. Friedman, Answering the Bayesioskeptical Challenge, I INT'L J. EVMD. & PROOF
276, 276-78 (1997) (presenting a model of this view). For an earlier, somewhat simpler model, see Richard
0. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MIcH. L. REv. 1021, 1032-41 (1977).
105. The common law system may, however, take the point too far, applying a "one-size-fits-al"
standard of persuasion to most issues within a case. I have suggested that a different, more stringent
standard than the usual civil "more likely than not" may be appropriate when the issue is whether the
defendant was the liable party or, alternatively, not involved at all. See Friedman, supra note 104, at 279.
106. See FED. R. EVID. 407.
107. See FED. R. EVID. 408.
108. I have offered some contemplations on the merits of these rules in Friedman, supra note 53, at
xlii-liv. See also LEONARD, supra note 53, §§ 2.1 to 2.9, 3.1 to 3.9 (providing a comprehensive discussion
of rules on subsequent remedial measures and settlement negotiations).
109. See supra text accompanying note 35.
1942 [Vol. 107: 1921
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broader substantive standards of criminality than it should. The problem is
particularly acute when the factfinder is a jury. Jurors typically have a one-shot
involvement with the legal system. They are less likely than legally trained
judges to be comfortable with a style of decisionmaking that trades off good
results in the case at hand (such as locking up bad people) for long-term
principle (such as imposing punishment only for conduct properly adjudicated).
On somewhat different grounds, I believe the aspiration to uniformity
also underlies much of the common law system's tendency to screen
scientific evidence rather aggressively."0 Scientific evidence often concerns
general propositions that recur from case to case; indeed, scientific experts
often have nothing to offer about the facts of a particular case. In such situa-
tions (for example, in the Bendectin litigation that gave rise to Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc."'), it may make little sense for
factfinders in separate but materially identical cases to determine the
scientific facts differently."2
110. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharamaceuticals, Inc.. 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993), the Court held that.
under the Federal Rules of Evidence, "the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or
evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable." This "gatekeping" function. id. at 597, "entails a
preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically
valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue." id. at
592-93. The Court went on to lay out four considerations that could enter into the decision. See id. at 593-
94. Daubert thus rejected a standard that, at least on its face, is even less hospitable to scientific evidence,
the "general acceptance" test articulated in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013. 1014 (1923). Before
Daubert, the "general acceptance" test was "the dominant standard for determining the admissibility of
novel scientific evidence at trial," Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585, and some states continue to adhere to it. see.
e.g., People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321 (Cal. 1994).
111. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
112. Professors Laurens Walker and John Monahan have suggested that in some circumstances
recurrent facts of this sort should be determined in the same manner as propositions of law-ultimately,
by the court of last resort. See John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining. Evaluating.
and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 477 (1986); Laurens Walker & John Monahan.
Social Facts: Scientific Methodology as Legal Precedent, 76 CAL L REv. 877 (1988); Laurens Walker &
John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law. 73 VA. L REv. 559 (1987).
Although there is considerable merit to their idea, the courts have not yet for the most pan adopted it. A
rather clumsy way of achieving much of the same objective may be to exclude scientific evidence if the
court finds it clearly unpersuasive. A better alternative is for courts to treat the evidence as admissible but
to consider granting summary judgment to the other side. In any case, however, the lack of case-specificity
makes feasible a uniform rule on admissibility of scientific evidence.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in General Electric Co. %. Joiner. 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997). might
seem to cut against my assertion that an aspiration to uniformity helps account for the fairly aggressive
screening of scientific evidence in the common law system. In Joiner, the Court held that appellate review
of decisions on the admissibility of scientific evidence should be under an "abuse of discretion"
standard-which was not contested-and that the application of this standard is no different when excluston
of the evidence in question leads to judgment as a matter of law. This deferential stance suggests tolerance
for a diversity of results. But this aspect of Joiner merely adhered to prior doctnne. It will be interesting
to see whether, in the context of mass or recurrent torts, the appellate courts really do tolerate different
results in different cases on the same evidentiary question. My speculation-fortified by the fact that Joiner
itself searchingly reviewed the facts and restored a district court decision excluding evidence crucial to the
plaintiff's case-is that they will not. In any event, the very fact that Joiner posed a problem for the
Supreme Court, resulting in a reversal of the court of appeals, reflects a tension between the aspiration for
uniformity and the practical need to have most evidentiary decisions made at the trial level.
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C. The Intellectual Framework
In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, common law rules
of evidence began to crystallize.' 3 This phenomenon reflected the broad
intellectual context of the time, in which the modern conception of probability
suddenly blossomed." 4 Of great importance was the empiricist intellectual
movement of the era, in which theologians, natural scientists, and historians
focused on the quality of evidence in seeking to derive truths that could not be
logically proved but could not reasonably be doubted. At least in part for
religious reasons, the movement was stronger in England than in Catholic
Europe."5 A preference for firsthand observation was a key feature of the
113. Following Langbein, Damaka states that "Anglo-American evidence law ... was largely
nonexistent in its present form as late as the middle decades of the eighteenth century." DAMASKA, supra
note 1, at 4 n.4; see also Langbein, supra note 80, at 1172. I believe that this is an overstatement, or at
least subject to misunderstanding. Macnair and I hope to show that some aspects of what became modem
hearsay law were well-established, sometimes startlingly so, by the middle of the 17th century. Certainly,
there was an identifiable law of evidence, some features of which are recognizable today, before the time
of Geoffrey Gilbert, who died in 1726; Gilbert's treatise, see GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
(Garland Publ'g, 1979) (1754), was not the first broad attempt to articulate evidentiary law. See, e.g., GILES
DUNCOMBE, TRIALS PER PAlS, OR THE LAW OF ENGLAND, CONCERNING JURIES BY NISI PRIUS 181-248
(R.H. Helmholz & Bernard D. Reams Jr. eds., William S. Hein & Co. 1980) (1682). Langbein is correct,
however, that until late in the 18th century much of the law of evidence did not have the relatively
consistent exclusionary effectiveness with which we associate it today.
114. By the "modem conception of probability," I mean a concept of uncertainty subject to rigorous
mathematical treatment and capable of being applied both to the outcomes of chance processes and degrees
of belief in propositions. See IAN HACKING, THE EMERGENCE OF PROBABILITY 1, 6, 11-12 (1975). In 1654,
a correspondence between Pierre de Fermat and Blaise Pascal showed how complex problems concerning
probabilities in games of chance could be solved by careful mathematical approaches. See F.N. DAVID,
GAMES, GODS AND GAMBLING: THE ORIGINS AND HISTORY OF PROBABILITY AND STATISTICAL IDEAS
FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE NEWTONIAN ERA 70-97 (1962). This correspondence is traditionally
recognized as "the beginning of mathematical probability theory." LORRAINE DASTON, CLASSICAL
PROBABILITY IN THE ENLIGHTENMENT 15 (1988). Three years later, Christianus Huygens published the first
systematic mathematical treatment of probability, see CHRISTIANUS HUYGENS, DE RATIOCINIIS IN LUDO
ALEAE (London, S. Keimer 1714) (1657), a work of widespread and longstanding significance, see DAVID,
supra, at 110-16, 132 (describing the impact of Huygens's work). In the preceding period, according to
Hacking, "probability" was determined not by evidential support, but by approval or support from respected
people. See HACKING, supra, at 22-23. This characterization, however, is controversial. See James Franklin,
The Ancient Legal Sources of Seventeenth-Century Probability, in THE USES OF ANTIQUITY 123, 133
(Stephen Gaukroger ed., 1991) (contending that probability as used in law did indeed mean "well supported
by evidence"). See generally PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK
(1996); DASTON, supra, at 6-15 (summarizing scholarship on the early history of probability).
115. See SHAPIRO, supra note 81, at 7. As Shapiro writes:
The attempt to build an intermediate level of knowledge, short of absolute certainty
but above the level of mere opinion, was made by an overlapping group of
theologians and naturalists. For the Protestant theologians, who rejected Roman
Catholic assertions of infallibility, the central question was whether religious truths,
such as the existence of God, miracles, the biblical narratives, and various doctrines
and practices of the church, could survive skeptical attack, once they were stripped
of claims to absolute truth and reduced to claims based on evidence. For the
naturalists, the central problem was that of making truthful statements about natural
phenomena which could be observed but could not be reduced to the kinds of
logical, mathematical demonstrations that traditionally had been thought to yield
unquestionable truths. Both groups concluded that reasonable men, employing their
senses and rational faculties, could derive truths that they would have no reason to
doubt.
1944
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movement. Hostility to hearsay testimony was common in nonlegal settings as
well as in English law.1 6 Thus, in a nonlegal religious publication written
around 1670, Sir Matthew Hale argued: "That which is reported by many
Eyewitnesses hath greater motives of credibility than that which is reported by
few ... and finally, that which is reported by credible persons of their own
view, than that which they receive by hear-say from those that report upon
their own view."
' 1 7
It is not surprising, then, that Geoffrey Gilbert's hugely influential treatise
on the law of evidence,'" 8 first published in 1754 but written several decades
earlier, 9 begins with an explicitly probabilistic analysis of the quality of
evidence, closely following the schema of John Locke's Essay Concerning the
Human Understanding.'20 (Indeed, Gilbert published an abstract of the Essay
around the time he wrote the evidence treatise.)' 2 ' This emphasis on
probability has persisted over the centuries within the common law system.
t -2
Id. (citations omitted); see also LEEUWEN, supra note 81, at xlii (speaking of the Protestant view of ""sveral
levels of certainty," intended "to avoid both dogmatism with its claim to absolute certainty and skepticism
with its denial of the possibility of any knowledge whatcver'); Franklin, supra note 114. at 139 (contending
that "[tihe first connection noticed between dice and the evaluation of evidence, and the first use of the
word 'probability' in connection with gambling," occur in a 1638 work that -attacks the Catholic demand
for certainty in matters of religion" (citing William Chillingworth's 1638 The Religion of Protestants-a
Safe Way to Salvation)).
116. See SHAPIRO, supra note 81, at 198. As Shapiro explains:
Early modem historians, both English and Continental. frequently made reference to the
Polybian critique of hearsay. Naturalists of the seventeenth century. anxious to eliminate fable
and imaginary flora and fauna from natural history, also emphasized the necessity of firsthand
and corroborating testimony. Anglican theologians seeking to demonstrate the validity of
Scripture emphasized the superiority of firsthand over hearsay testimony.
Id. at 198-99.
117. MATrHEW HALE, THE PRIMITIVE ORIGINATION OF MANKIND 129 (London. William Godbid
1677).
118. See GILBERT, supra note 113.
119. Gilbert died in 1726. For an inquiry into when he wrote the treatise. see Michael Macnair. Sir
Jeffrey Gilbert and His Treatises, 15 J. LEGAL HIsT. 252, 266-67 n.107 (1994). Macnair concludes that
Gilbert wrote the evidence treatise before 1710. See id.
120. Gilbert begins as follows:
The first Thing to be treated of, is the Evidence that ought to be offer'd to the Jury, and by
what Rules of Probability it ought to be weigh'd and consider'd. In the first Place. it has been
observed by a very learned Man, that there are several Degrees from perfect Certainty and
Demonstration, quite down to Improbability and Unlikeliness, even to the Confines of
Impossibility; and there are several Acts of the Mind proportion'd to these Degrees of Evidence.
which may be called the Degrees of Assent, from full Assurance and Confidence, quite down
to Conjecture, Doubt. Distrust, and Disbelief. Now what is to be done in all Trials of Right, is
to range all Matters in the Scale of Probability. so as to lay most Weight where the Cause ought
to preponderate, and thereby to make the most exact Discerment that can be in Relation to the
Right.
GILBERT, supra note 113, at 1-2; see also JOHN LOCKE, ArN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING
(Peter H. Niddich ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1975) (1690). Macnair has stated his longstanding view that the
ideas Gilbert borrowed from Locke were themselves legal in origin. See e-mail from Marshall Macnair
(Oct. 8, 1997) (on file with author). Barbara Shapiro has come to the same conclusion. See Barbara
Shapiro, The Concept "'Fact": Legal Origins and Cultural Diffusion. 26 ALBION I. 1 & n.l. 24-26 (1994).
121. See GEOFFREY GILBERT, AN ABSTRACT OF THE ESSAY OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 19-22 (1709)
(discussing probability).
122. It appears that in the early years of formal probability theory, the connections between theories
of legal evidence and theories of probability were drawn in the Continental system as well. Indeed, it is
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Culling Anglo-American writings on evidence from the time of Gilbert to the
modern era, William Twining has articulated the "rationalist tradition" in
evidence.'2 One of its cornerstones is the proposition that "[t]he
establishment of the truth of alleged facts in adjudication is typically a matter
of probabilities, falling short of absolute certainty." 2
4
One can see the effects of this approach in common law attempts to
articulate standards of persuasion in probabilistic terms, with the frank
acknowledgment that the need for decision may require judgment
notwithstanding enormous doubt as to accuracy."z This approach, it seems
to me, is more candid than the Continental search, described by Dama~ka, for
the factfinder's conviction intime or "full conviction"-in some jurisdictions,
even in civil cases. 126 The problem of how confident we must be in the truth
of the claimant's case to hold for the claimant is a universal one, not
adequately addressed by Dama~ka's suggestion that, in the Continental system,
it may be "the judge, rather than the party, who failed to carry the burden of
establishing facts."'' 2 7 It is one party or the other, and not the judge, who
must lose for failure to establish facts. Much the same can be said about the
burden of production. This burden undoubtedly takes on a "distinctive
character and greater importance" in the adversary system. 128 But if we recast
it as a risk of insufficiency, we can see that it too reflects a universal problem:
the unshakable question of who loses with respect to a given proposition if the
evidence on that proposition is paltry.
interesting to note that the French probability theorist Fermat and the Dutch probability theorist Huygens
were both lawyers. See DAVID, supra note 114, at 71, 111; Franklin, supra note 114, at 125. Moreover,
according to Daston,
legal theories of evidence supplied probabilists with a model for ordered and even roughly
quantified degrees of subjective probability. The hierarchy of proofs within Roman and canon
law led mathematicians to conceive of degrees of probability as degrees of uncertainty along
a graduated spectrum of belief, ranging from total ignorance or uncertainty to firm conviction
or 'moral' certainty.
DASTON, supra note 114, at 14. The Roman-canonical hierarchy of proof was overthrown in favor of the
principle of free proof in the legal revolution that followed in the wake of the French Revolution. See
DAMAMKA, supra note I, at 20-21. One factor behind the overhaul may have been that the hierarchy of
proof did not accurately track probability theory, because it dealt in discrete levels rather than in continuous
gradations, and the bureaucratically oriented Continental system was too rigid to adapt without "radical
surgery." Id. at 151. In any event, as I describe below, it appears that the modem Continental approach to
proof reflects probability considerably less than does the common law. See infra notes 126-128 and
accompanying text.
123. See WILLIAM TWINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE 32-91 (1990).
124. Id. at 71, 73 tbl.l. Twining acknowledges commentary by Continental scholars who argue that
the model of adjudication he describes fits inquisitorial models better than adversarial ones. See id. at 76-
77, 81-82. Whether or not that is so, the fact remains that Twining's description of the assumptions
underlying rationalist theories of evidence and proof have been drawn from Anglo-American writings. I
suspect that it would be difficult to draw a similar account from Continental writings.
125. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (arguing that the trier
of fact in a judicial proceeding "cannot acquire unassailably accurate knowledge of what happened," but
only a belief as to what probably happened).
126. See DAMASKA, supra note 1, at 40 n.29, 114 n.78.
127. Id. at 83.
128. Id. at 82.
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The definition of relevant evidence-perhaps the most fundamental
concept in the rationalist schemet 29-is articulated in explicitly probabilistic
terms. 3 ' The cognate concept of probative value-really a cardinalization of
the concept of relevance-is also inherently probabilistic. And the rationalist
approach might help to explain both what Damaka properly terms the Anglo-
American system's preoccupation with "foundational" matters' and its
receptivity to information bearing on credibility. 32 The value of evidence
depends not only on what it is or what it says, but also on its origins.' 33 To
the extent that it appears plausible that the evidence could have arisen by a
course of events inconsistent with the proposition for which the evidence is
offered, the evidence will lose probative value. Information about the
evidence's origins-including any defects in the truthtelling capacity of the
witness that might have led her to testify as she did-thus becomes a matter
of intense concern, even though it may involve an inquiry a step removed from
the primary facts at issue in the litigation.'3
The rationalist approach appears to reflect a broader tendency to embrace
structures that seem analytically sound and probing, even at the expense of
theoretical and practical simplicity, and even when the structures themselves
create more issues to litigate. Damagka expresses perplexity at the holding of
Martin v. Ohio, 35 in which the Supreme Court sanctioned a rule providing
that, while the prosecution was required to prove murder beyond a reasonable
doubt, the defendant was required to prove self-defense by only a
preponderance of the evidence. Damaika notes the "psychological complexities
129. Note the famous passage in JAMES BRADLEY THAYER. PRELIMINARY TREATtSE ON THiE LAW OF
EVIDENCE 264-65 (Boston, Little, Brown 1898). stating that the proposition that irrelevant evidence is
inadmissible is "not so much a rule of evidence as a presupposition involved in the very conception of a
rational scheme of evidence." See also FED R. EVID. 402 (requinng relevance).
130. See FED. R. EvID. 401 (.'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence." (emphasis added)).
131. DAMAtKA, supra note 1, at 63.
132. I believe that, in analyzing the common law treatment of credibility. Damaka puts too much
emphasis on the division between judge and jury. He draws a distinction between the relevance of
evidence, depending "solely on the cognitive potential of the information," and the weight of evidence,
depending also "on the credibility of the information's transmitter." Id. at 55. (This does not stmke me as
the best way of drawing the distinction, which is really one of convenience. Relevance is a binary, yes-or-
no term, and weight a matter of degree; we could replace the term irrelevant by "no weight" and lose
nothing in the analysis.) He then indicates that relevance is determined by the judge and weight by the jury.
See id. at 56. This is an overstatement. The jury, where there is one, is generally left free, within broad
bounds, to determine how probative evidence is. The bounds are particularly broad with respect to
judgments of credibility, a matter on which courts profess no greater expertise than jurors.
133. I have elaborated on this idea in a prior review essay. See Richard D. Friedman. Still Photographs
in the Flow of ime, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 243 (1995) (review essay).
134. On the Continent, according to Damaka, analysis of the potential probative value of information
includes assessment of the reliability of the transmitter. See DAMAtKA, supra note I, at 55. 1 suspect.
however, that Continental courts are not as receptive as common law courts to information that is unrelated
to the case except insofar as it bears on the credibility of a witness.
135. 480 U.S. 228, 236 (1987).
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in this mandate of the law-if it is taken seriously."' 36 From an American
perspective, however, it reflects a plausible application of decision theory in
weighing different types of errors differently, assuming (as the Ohio lawmakers
may well have believed) that an inaccurate finding that the defendant
committed the killing is far worse than an inaccurate finding that he was not
acting in self-defense. 137 Thus, too, American courts adhere to the doctrine
of conditional relevance, an attempt-overly rigid as classically articulated, but
useful if applied sensitively-to set out meticulously the dependence of one
uncertain proposition on another. 38 And thus, too, they pay a great deal of
attention to the distinction between fact and law, a distinction that Continental
jurists do their best to avoid. 39
D. Summary
As I have attempted to show, the three aspects of the common law
evidentiary system discussed in this part-the focus on individual rights, the
desire for legl uniformity, and the rationalist approach-explain a great deal
of the landscape of Anglo-American evidentiary law, not only in its broad
features but also in its doctrinal outcroppings. In addition, as I explain in the
next part, these three aspects help explain the existence and the persistence of
the institutional pillars on which Dama~ka puts great weight.
III. INSTITUTIONAL PILLARS
Damagka believes that much about the common law evidentiary system
can be explained by the three institutional pillars he identifies-the divided
trial court, compressed trials, and the adversary system. 40 These institutional
aspects of the evidentiary system are unquestionably significant. But I believe
136. DAMA9KA, supra note I, at 92 n.36.
137. I do not mean to imply that Martin, decided by a 5-4 vote in the Supreme Court, was a simple
case. Ohio defines murder, however, as "purposely, and with prior calculation and design, caus[ing] the
death of another." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.01 (Anderson 1991). At least arguably, self-defense need
not negate any of the elements of the crime. See Martin, 480 U.S. at 233-34. But see id. at 237-40 (Powell,
J., dissenting) (contending that, in this case, the defense did negate the "prior calculation and design"
element, and so the burden should not be imposed on the defendant).
138. See supra Subsection I.B.5.
139. See DAMASKA, supra note i, at 53-54 (arguing that "problems pertaining to fact-finding that are
expressly regulated and highly visible in the fish-bowl world of jury trials remain veiled from view in
Continental procedure, shrouded by the secrecy of the deliberation room," and attributing the difference
to "the internal division of the tribunal into two parts--each part deciding separately and in isolation from
the other"); Jescheck, supra note 79, at 252 ("The separate treatment of the question of law and that of fact
seems to us somewhat arbitrary, as the selecting and examining of the relevant facts depends upon a proper
understanding of the law."). Clearly, the fact-law distinction is related to the adversary system and the
division between the court and the jury, two of Damalka's institutional pillars. I believe, however, that the
problem is more fundamentally one of separating out the determinations that should be made at trial from
those that should be made at higher levels.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 7-8.
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that Damaka, in large part because he pays relatively little attention to the
features I discussed in Part I, puts too much weight on these institutions as
sources of the observable characteristics of evidentiary law. The converse
formulation, in fact, is more accurate: The individual rights orientation and (to
a lesser extent) the other characteristics I have described account to a
considerable extent for these institutions. In this part, I analyze each of
Dama~ka's pillars.
A. The Archetypal Trial Court
Damaka's first pillar is the classical trial court of the common law
system, presided over by a professional judge and using a collective body of
laypeople, the jury, as factfinders. In examining the impact of this system on
the Anglo-American evidentiary system, the factors I discussed in Part II are
important for two reasons.
First, the institution of the jury did not originate accidentally. As I
contended in Part II, the jury reflects political values of long and deep standing
and has long been regarded as a significant protection of individual
freedom.' 4' To a large extent, then, the rights orientation provides the
bedrock on which this pillar rests. As Damalka discusses, the archetype of the
jury trial has lost importance in recent years. 42 The civil jury has practically
disappeared from several common law jurisdictions, including England,'
and in the United States much litigation has been shunted to alternative forms
to avoid the jury.' 44 Nevertheless, the system remains important in American
civil litigation.44 And in criminal cases, the jury retains great importance
throughout the common law world. 46 This continued-and differential
141. See supra Section II.A.
142. See DAMASKA, supra note I, at 126-27.
143. See id. at 126 & n.4.
144. Such alternative forms include arbitration and administrative proceedings. See Atlas Roofing Co.
v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n. 430 U.S. 442, 460-61 (1977) ("[Tlhc right to a jury tmal
turns not solely on the nature of the issue to be resolved but also on the forum in which it is to be
resolved.").
145. Damaka attributes the strength of the civil jury in the United States to constitutional protection
See DAMA KA, supra note I, at 126 n.4. That is only part of the story, however. The Seventh Amendment
has never been incorporated against the states, and so it guarantees civil junes only in federal eases. Given
the relative ease with which state constitutions are amended, the universality of civil junes throughout the
United States suggests a strong continued attachment to them. Note also that the ambit of the civil jury has
recently been expanded in one important respect: Since 1991 legislation, the jury right is applicable in most
Title VII litigation. See Civil Rights Act of 1991. Pub. L. No. 102-166. § 102. 105 Stat. 1071, 1073
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 198 1a (1994)).
146. It may be that the system is being undermined to a slight extent by sentencing guidelines that
place great weight on misconduct that is not tried by the jury in the case. See Witte v United States. 515
U.S. 389 (1995) (upholding the consideration in sentencing of relevant conduct not adjudicated in the case
at hand). This does not reflect a major change, however. Indeed. if sentencing guidelines achieve their goal
of limiting judicial discretion, on balance they give increased importance to (the jury's) determinations of
guilt. A more serious threat to the jury system is the prevalence of plea bargaining. Still, plea bargaining
supplants formal factual determination altogether, it does not replace jury factfinding by an alternatve
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-level of importance is less reflective of confidence in the jury's abilities as
factfinder than it is of the enduring (albeit weakened) force of the political
values that have long supported the jury.
Second, if I am right that these factors explain much of the common law
evidentiary system, one might approach somewhat skeptically explanations
treating the structure of the trial court as having critical importance. That is,
in fact, how I approach the four considerations raised by the archetypical trial
court that Dama~ka investigates-both the more commonly cited one (having
to do with the shortcomings of lay decisionmaking), to which he does not
accord much significance, and the more novel ones (having to do with the
collective character of the jury, the need to compensate for cryptic verdicts,
and the divided nature of the common law trial court), to which he does.
1. Shortcomings of Lay Decisionmaking
As I have already suggested,'47 Dama~ka is quite right in arguing that
the supposed cognitive inabilities of lay jurors are of far less significance in
justifying exclusionary rules than is often supposed. 48 Dama~ka properly
argues that there is no good basis for believing that jurors are so deficient
relative to a judge in considering evidence as to justify wide-ranging
exclusionary doctrines when a jury is the factfinder, but not when a judge is.
I would go further, arguing on an absolute as well as a differential basis. That
is, I contend that if an extraordinarily wise decisionmaker would accord an
item of evidence significant probative value, then truth determination will
usually be helped rather than hurt by presenting the evidence to a real
factfinder, whether the factfinder is a judge or a jury. At the same time,
though, as I suggested in Section II.B, there is another sort of defect of lay
decisionmaking that is significant: a shortened perspective that can lead to uses
of information in ways that tend to disregard legal norms.
2. The Collective Character of the Jury
Dama~ka stresses the collective character of the jury as a rationale for
certain provisions of the common law evidence system: There is, he claims,
a "need ... to give structure to communication among amateur
system. See Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial: Alternatives to
the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 931, 932 (1983) ("Plea bargaining ... substitutes a regime
of split-the-difference for a judicial determination of guilt or innocence ... .
147. See supra Section I.A.
148. See DAMA KA, supra note 1, at 28-37. Dama~ka also makes the interesting and plausible point
that the factfinding function of the jury may indeed be taken as a factor weighing "against saturation of
factfinding activities by law," because that function requires the implementation of often complex legal
principles by laypersons. Id. at 26.
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adjudicators."149 Thus, limited admissibility rules and evidentiary instructions
are best understood "as devices directed at influencing group
deliberations."'' 50 In Part I, I offered other ways of understanding such rules
and instructions, but Damaka's point is an interesting one; it seems likely that,
as a general rule, discourse is more easily constrained than thought is, and
therefore the former may be the more useful target of jury instructions.
Dama~ka substantially overstates the point, however. Recognizing the
collective nature of the audience of instructions does not make the instructions
any more coherent; given this incoherence, the fact that they are addressed
collectively merely means that they are likely to be flouted collectively. And,
as Damaka acknowledges, collective verdicts most often follow the individual
jurors' inclinations. '51
3. Compensating for Cryptic Verdicts
Dama .ka argues that because the output of the jury-its verdict-is so
opaque and therefore so difficult to challenge, the common law system finds
a "palliative" by more aggressively regulating the jury's input, the "suitability
of the database" supplied to it. 52 Once again, the point has some merit but
seems overstated. For one thing, even when an inscrutable jury is the
factfinder, we do in fact have output control, sometimes before the output is
actually created: Judgment as a matter of law in the American system may be
granted on the pleadings,'53 by summary judgment after a suitable oppor-
tunity for discovery, '- or at trial, before or after the case actually goes to the
jury.155 Given the deference paid to judicial factual findings,' 5 it is not at
all clear that an opaque jury verdict necessarily entails weak output control.
Indeed, the question of whether to control output before the factual findings
are actually made cannot be substantially affected by the question of whether
the output would eventually be articulate or not; in any event, the issue is
whether the anticipated or actual evidence is sufficient to support a verdict for
the party resisting early judgment. Output control after factual findings are
made is somewhat easier and more satisfactory if the findings are articulate-a
reviewing court need only inquire whether the findings actually made were
sufficiently supported, whereas the court must try to reconstruct a plausible
149. Id. at 37.
150. Id. at 40.
151. See id. at 38; see also HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, Dl'E AMERICAN JURY 488 (1966)
(stating that "with very few exceptions the first ballot decides the outcome of the verdict." and so "the real
decision is often made before the deliberation begins* (emphasis omitted)).
152. DAMAtKA, supra note 1, at 44.
153. See FED. R. COv. P. 12(b)(6), (c).
154. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
155. See FED. R. CIv. P. 50.
156. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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line of reasoning from an inarticulate verdict. In most cases, however, the line
of reasoning that the jury is likely to have taken is plain. And, as Dama~ka
acknowledges, even a demand for articulated factual findings may yield post
hoe argument on the part of the court reviewing the findings, rather than the
factfinder's actual course of reasoning.'57
Apart from this, input control is a very poor remedy for weakness of
output control. If an item of evidence will tend to lead the factfinder toward
the truth rather than away from it, then presumptively it ought to be presented,
regardless of whether the finding of fact will be articulated. By the same
token, if an item of evidence degrades the database, it ought to be excluded,
regardless of whether the finding of fact will be articulated. Thus the need to
compensate for weakness of output control has probably not exerted great force
on evidentiary decisionmakers to impose significant input restrictions.
4. The Divided Trial Court
Finally, Dama~ka argues that the very fact of the trial court's division into
two parts-one that can make admissibility decisions and another that will not
receive evidence held inadmissible-has a significant impact in "creat[ing] a
space for the growth of evidentiary doctrines and practices. '  I agree with
Damagka to a great extent: "[T]he problem of unbiting the apple of
knowledge"'59 makes enforcement of some exclusionary rules difficult, and
perhaps not worthwhile, when the decisionmaker is unitary. Once again,
however, the point must not be taken too far.
First, institutions are not exogenous to the system. If we care sufficiently
about the exclusionary rules, we will shape our institutions to protect
them. 60 One could easily imagine an expedient that could protect much of
the strength of those rules and yet allow an undivided tribunal at trial: Pretrial
motions to exclude evidence, which are often made even when there will be
a jury trial, could routinely be made before another judge. Such a temporal
division would not remove all apple-unbiting problems, but it would go a
significant distance in that direction.' 6'
Second, it must again be remembered that only part of the force of
exclusionary rules lies in their effect on the factfinder's consideration of
evidence. Exclusionary rules frequently have decisive importance in
determining sufficiency questions-that is, in determining whether the
157. See DAMA8KA, supra note 1, at 43-45.
158. Id. at 46-47.
159. Id. at 50.
160. Indeed, the desire to protect some exclusionary rules may be a factor strengthening support for
the jury system, at least in criminal trials.
161. Damagka also mentions the possibility of a tribunal with two separate professional parts. See
DAMA8KA, supra note 1, at 27 & n.2.
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factfinder, judge or jury, has a sufficient basis for reaching a given conclusion
at all. 162 Thus, exclusionary rules do not take on nearly so much of an
"ethereal quality" absent division of the tribunal as Damalka suggests.163
5. Summary
In short, Damagka is clearly right that the structure of the archetypal
common law trial court has a significant impact on evidentiary law and that
the impact is different from that commonly supposed. The cognitive
incapacities of juries are, as he argues, probably less important in explaining
evidentiary law than is commonly supposed. But the danger that the jury will
act on its own short-term policy instincts is real. And I believe that Dama~ka
places too much emphasis on the structure of the court as a foundation for
many evidentiary rules.
Two Janus-like points may emerge from this analysis. First, if an
exclusionary rule is not justified by some reason unrelated to the presence of
the jury as factfinder, then the rule is probably not justified by the presence of
the jury. Second, if an exclusionary rule does reflect fundamental rights or
substantial policy objectives-as I argued in Part II that some exclusionary
rules do-then the presence of the jury as factfinder is by no means an
essential, or even particularly important, condition for maintaining it.
Hearsay law reflects both points. It appears that the near abolition of the
civil jury in Britain has acted as a catalyst for the abolition of the civil rule
against hearsay;'64 similarly, it is commonplace for judges in bench trials to
ignore the hearsay exclusion. I do not believe, however, that this catalytic
effect has arisen in substantial part because the replacement of the jury as
factfinder in fact makes hearsay a more satisfactory form of evidence. Instead,
it has arisen because the rhetoric of hearsay doctrine has for so long put such
stress on the supposed incapacity of the jury. Looking beyond the rhetoric, the
case for a more receptive attitude toward civil hearsay is very powerful even
if a jury acts as factfinder. Correspondingly, arguments based on the
fundamental right to confrontation continue to support exclusion of some forms
of hearsay offered against a criminal defendant. As suggested by recent
162. See supra Subsection I.B.4.
163. DAMAtKA, supra note I, at 127.
164. See, e.g., Civil Evidence Act, 1995, ch. 38. § I. The Act resulted from a recommendation by the
Law Commission for England and Wales, which emphasized "the greatly reduced use ofjriunes n cvil trials
other than for defamation proceedings." THE LAw COMM'N FOR ENG. AND WALES. CONSULTATION PAPER
No. 117, THE HEARSAY RULE IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS 52 (1991). For a canvass of the law of hearsay and
reform proposals in other common law jurisdictions. see id. at 112-30. The history in Scotland as stmalar.
See Civil Evidence Act, 1988, ch. 32, § 2 (abolishing the rule against hearsay in civil cases). ScoTrtsti
LAW COMM'N, No. 100, EVIDENCE: REPORT ON CORROBORATION, HEARSAY AND RELATED MATTERS IN
CIVIL PROCEEDINGS 16-17 (1986) (emphasizing the limited use of the civil jury): id. at 23 (recommending
the abolition of the rule against hearsay).
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Continental developments that Dama~ka finds surprising,' 65 the absence of
a jury does not undermine these arguments.
B. Concentrated Proceedings
Damagka's second pillar is the common law form of the continuous trial.
This concentrated form, which contrasts with the more episodic form of many
trials in Continental Europe, is attributable in part to the archetype of the jury
as factfinder-lay jurors have other things to do and cannot easily commit to
long, open-ended proceedings. 66 Concentration is not only a practical
necessity, however; to some extent, it is a desideratum as well, and Dama~ka
notes that Continental courts are moving in this direction. 67
Anglo-American proceedings, on the other hand, have acquired some of
the attributes of episodic proceedings without altering the concentration of the
trial itself. Pretrial proceedings have grown tremendously in importance in this
century. Discovery in civil proceedings, and in many criminal ones as well,
provides for an extended, highly episodic opportunity to gather information
from various sources-friendly, neutral, and hostile-and to follow up on what
these reveal. Very often, the key adjudication in a case is not a verdict at trial,
but a ruling on a motion for summary judgment, which assesses the sufficiency
of the evidence gathered for trial and presented on paper to the court. If
summary judgment is granted properly, the case ends; if it is denied, the case
likely settles. If the case does proceed to trial, discovery minimizes the chances
of surprise, and a pretrial order may well ensure that the evidence is not only
assembled and shared, but also confined and ordered before trial. Moreover,
much of the evidence presented at trial may have been set beforehand-not
only documents and other tangible evidence but increasingly testimony also,
in the form of depositions.168 The trial remains the show, but to a great
165. The European Court of Human Rights has issued several significant decisions under Article 6 of
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concerning the
confrontation right. See, e.g., SaYdi v. France, 261 Eur. Ct. H.R. (set. A) at 58 (1993); Kostovski v.
Netherlands, 166 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23 (1989). Damaika's reaction is detailed below. See infra text
accompanying note 203. I have discussed this line of decisions elsewhere. See Richard D. Friedman,
Confrontation Rights of Criminal Defendants, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST WORLD CONFERENCE ON NEW
TRENDS IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION AND EVIDENCE 533 (J.F. Nijboer & J.M. Reijntjcs eds., 1997).
166. The traveling nature of many English courts contributed to making episodic trials generally
unfeasible. A standard history of the itinerant courts is J.S. COCKBURN, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH ASSIZES,
1558-1714 (1972).
167. See DAMA9KA, supra note 1, at 59.
168. Videotaping of depositions has become much more common in recent years and since 1993 has
received explicit sanction in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30. Videotaping the
depositions of expert witnesses for use at trial, thus avoiding the need to pay the expert for her waiting time
at trial, has become routine practice in some jurisdictions. See, e.g., FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.390(b) (providing
that "(t]he testimony of an expert or skilled witness may be taken at any time before the trial in accordance
with the rules for taking depositions"). Arizona has gone so far as to allow general use of depositions
instead of live testimony without a need to show unavailability of the witness or to secure the consent of
the adversary. See ARIZ. R. CIv. P. 32(a).
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extent it is a prepackaged product.
Damaka recognizes these changes, of course, and he describes some of
them himself. 69 His essential point is that evidentiary arrangements that
made sense when the pillar of trial-centeredness stood strong no longer make
sense as that pillar is crumbling. I agree, but only in part. In explaining why,
I will concentrate on two of Damagka's examples, hearsay and foundational
matters.
With respect to hearsay, if a proponent presents the statement of an out-
of-court declarant who could have been a live witness, a "best evidence"
rationale for excluding the evidence arises: Exclusion will likely induce this
proponent, or at least others in a similar position, to present evidence that is
better than the prior declaration-the live testimony of the declarant. But if
the opponent has time to react, either because the trial is episodic or because
there has been sufficient pretrial preparation, it becomes a more feasible
response to say to the opponent, in effect, "If you want to examine the
declarant, produce her as a witness yourself. And if you want to dig up
impeachment material on her, you have (or have had) sufficient opportunity
to do so." In this sense, the decline of trial-centeredness weighs against
excluding hearsay.
With respect to foundational matters, Damagka emphasizes that, in
episodic trials, courts may not need to insist on answers to foundational
questions when the evidence is first introduced. 70 Neither do courts in
concentrated proceedings, however; admitting evidence subject to later
connection is routine practice in common law COurtS.' 7' The better
argument in Damagka's favor is similar to the one concerning hearsay.
Evidence without a foundation, such as a document lacking authentication,
is inferior to the same evidence accompanied by the foundation. A ruling
excluding the evidence unless the proponent produces the foundation may
induce this proponent (or future proponents similarly situated) to do so. But
if the opponent has sufficient time to react, it becomes more feasible to say,
"If you really want to challenge the authenticity of this genuine-looking
document, you will have your chance. Meanwhile, it will be admitted.""'
Caveats are in order, however. First, we cannot say that evidentiary law
has been nonresponsive-"adrift"-in these regards. Restraints against hearsay,
especially civil hearsay, have been loosening up throughout the common law
169. See DAMASKA, supra note I, at 129.
170. See id. at 63-64.
171. See FED. R. EviD. 104(b) (providing for the admission of evidence "upon. or subject to." the
introduction of evidence sufficient to find a foundational fact).
172. I have elsewhere argued for such an approach. See Friedman. Conditional Probative Value. supra
note 60, at 452-53, 476-77; Friedman, Refining Conditional Probative Value. supra note 60. at 464-65; see
also Nance, supra note 60, at 445-53 (discussing such an approach).
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world, 73  as have foundational standards.' 74  Second, we should not
exaggerate the degree of surprise in a trial-centered setting. It seems unlikely
that, before the advent of modem discovery, opponents were usually surprised
by the most important hearsay offered against them; for the most part, I
believe, they had time to react before trial. Similarly, I suspect that, even in
truly compressed proceedings, important surprise evidence posing serious
foundational questions was more the exception than the norm.
Most important, the decline of trial-centeredness leaves some rationales
and situations essentially untouched. A large part of the remaining attachment
to foundational requirements stems from an intellectual habit of regarding the
foundation as indeed foundational-that is, as a set of propositions absent
which the evidence is intolerably weak. Even if divorced from the institution
of trial-centeredness, then, foundational requirements would have roots in the
rationalist framework I discussed in Part II. As for hearsay, the decline of trial-
centeredness has substantial importance only with respect to certain types of
out-of-court statements: those by declarants whom the proponent could have
produced but did not. It has little impact with respect to hearsay by declarants
who are dead or otherwise unavailable'75 or, for that matter, by those who
actually testify live at trial. 76 And it provides very little support for
admissibility of what I described in Part II as the most troublesome type of
173. See supra notes 164, 168 and accompanying text. The wide-open residual exceptions to the rule
against hearsay have recently been moved from Rules 803 and 804 to a separate home of their own, Rule
807, to make room for more enumerated exceptions. See FED. R. EVID. 807 advisory committee's note. The
Law Commission for England and Wales has recently issued a report recommending substantial limitations
on the rule against hearsay in criminal cases. See THE LAW COMM'N FOR ENG. AND WALES, No. 245,
EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS: HEARSAY AND RELATED Topics 54 (1997) (emphasizing the rule's
"exclusion of cogent evidence"); id. at 194-201 (recommending, inter alia, a broad qualified exception for
statements by unavailable declarants and a discretionary "safety-valve" exception).
174. See FED. R. EVID. 901 advisory committee's note. As the note reads:
Today, such available procedures as requests to admit and pretrial conference afford the means
of eliminating much of the need for authentication or identification. Also, significant inroads
upon the traditional insistence on authentication and identification have been made by accepting
as at least prima facie genuine items of the kind treated in Rule 902 ....
Id.; see also FED R. EVID. 902 advisory committee's note ("The present rule collects and incorporates these
situations [in which self-authentication is allowed], in some instances expanding them to occupy a larger
area which their underlying considerations justify.").
175. The decline of trial-centeredness may have some impact in such cases: An opponent with greater
notice can at least produce information impeaching the declarant, even though he cannot confront the
declarant herself.
176. Damagka notes that, in the Continental system, when an out-of-court declarant's statement is
reported in court, "there is enough time ... to seek out this person for presentation in court ... [a]nd if
this person's court testimony differs from that quoted by the hearsay witness, the court has heard them both
and is thus in position to evaluate the relative trustworthiness." DAMASKA, supra note I, at 65. This
argument echoes one sometimes made in American discourse in favor of admissibility of prior statements.
See. e.g., Di Carlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 368 (2d Cir. 1925), quoted in FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)
advisory committee's note; 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 45, § 25 1, at 117-20. I think this argument overlooks
the difficulties in cross-examining a witness who fails to assert in court the complete substance of her prior
statement. I have discussed these difficulties at considerable length elsewhere. See Richard D. Friedman,
Prior Statements of a Witness: A Nettlesome Corner of the Hearsay Thicket, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 277.
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hearsay: statements that, if admitted, would amount to out-of-court testimony
against a criminal defendant.'"
C. The Adversary System
We come now to the third of Dama~ka's supporting pillars: the adversary
system, which he defines usefully as "a system of adjudication in which
procedural action is controlled by the parties and the adjudicator remains
essentially passive."'' 7 ' This is probably the most fundamental of Damagka's
three pillars-indeed, it is often mistakenly viewed as synonymous with the
common law system' 79-and it seems to be the most resistant to dramatic
change.' 80 It plainly has an enormous impact on evidentiary law. Dama9ka's
discussion of the adversary system is rich, subtle, and broad-ranging. I confine
myself to making a few points.
Damaka's essential theme is this: "[T]he ultimate objective of all
adjudicative proceedings" in the common law system is seen as the "just
settlement of controversies, ' 8 which Damalka refers to variously by such
terms as "conflict-solving"'' 12  or "dispute resolution."'813 This mission
supports the prominent role of the parties in the administration of justice, and
it "erects the considerations of disputational fairness-such as the balancing
of advantages between the litigants-to the status of values capable of
interfering with the search for the truth."' ' It also explains why a
competitive factfinding style appears acceptable, even desirable, in common
law countries, "despite the departures it entails from ordinary factfinding
practices."'8 5
Dama~ka's argument that the common law's orientation toward dispute
resolution is a key source of its factfinding style is interesting and insightful,
but it does not capture the full picture. The mission of the overall legal
process may be dispute resolution, at least on the civil side, but the mission
177. Conceivably, one could argue that, even in this case, the hearsay should be admitted, given that
the accused can produce the declarant as part of his case if he wishes. Perhaps this argument has some
merit when the declarant is a child, where the demand for confrontation might be based on the cynical
anticipation that, if the demand were granted, the child would be inhibited from testifying. In general.
however, I believe the accused should have the right to have an adverse witness brought before him to
testify and to be cross-examined as part of the prosecution's case-not a right to bring her to court later
(assuming he could do so) as part of his own case, examining her while also giving her the opportunity
to repeat her story.
178. DAMAtKA, supra note I, at 74.
179. That both Anglo-American and Continental systems are varying hybrids of advemanal and
inquisitorial features is one of the pervasive themes of Damaka's celebrated earlier book. See DA5,AWKA.
supra note 15, at 4-6, 97-98.
180. See DAMAtKA, supra note 1. at 134.
181. Id. at 110.
182. Id. at 122.
183. Id. at 110, 124.
184. Id. at 124.
185. Id.
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of the adjudicative system is to determine the rights of the parties as accurately
as possible, subject to various constraints. To a large extent, the rights of the
parties generate the adversary system. That system has taken on a life of its
own, with significant implications for evidentiary law. But many evidentiary
restrictions are attributable to rights of the parties or to the other features of
the system elaborated in Part II, and they would retain their justification even
absent the adversary system.
1. The Mission of the Adjudicative System
I have some difficulty with the idea of designating one "mission"',8 6 for
a complex, multi-faceted system that has evolved over centuries in many
countries and that is subject to no central direction-especially a system in
which, as in a market, most actors are pursuing their self-interest. 87 It seems
unlikely to me from the start that so simplistic and abstract a concept could
bear the weight of the adversary system. But I will put those doubts aside for
this discussion.
Dama~ka views both criminal and civil litigation in the common law
system as preeminently serving the mission of dispute resolution.' In the
Continental system, on the other hand, he finds that civil litigation is oriented
toward dispute resolution but criminal adjudication "primarily serves the
realization of state policy toward crime."' 8 9 His chief support for this
analysis is that a general principle prevails throughout common law
adjudication and in civil Continental adjudication, but not in criminal
Continental adjudication, that only contested matters need be resolved.,'g
This principle is not universal within the common law system-allocution
proceedings in taking a criminal guilty plea serve some of the same purposes
as the Continental trial of a criminal who does not deny guilt' 9t -but it is a
fair generalization.
186. Id. at 75.
187. The market metaphor raises an issue I find perplexing. Even after reading Damalka, it seems to
me that those systems dominated by court officials (rather than the parties themselves) face one of the
principal problems endemic to bureaucracies operating without the advantage of market pressure, which
automatically internalizes costs and benefits. This is the problem of proportion, of how much to spend, in
time, money, and other resources, toward a given end. If I were a litigant in an inquisitorial system, I am
sure I would always be fearful that the judge was paying too little attention to my case-and if I were a
nonlitigant taxpayer, I would be sure that the judges were wasting my money delving deeply into triviali-
ties. The same problem arises in criminal litigation in the Anglo-American system, where the prosecutor
is a government lawyer and the defense lawyer is likely not paid by the defendant. On the civil side, at
least, this problem is far less severe, for litigation expenses and the benefits, if any, resulting from them
are more likely to fall on the same party.
188. See DAMA8KA, supra note 1, at 124.
189. Id. at 112.
190. See id. at 87, 103-04, 111-12, 116.
191. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(f) ("Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court should
not enter a judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is a factual
basis for the plea.").
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In assessing the significance of this matter, I think it is important to
distinguish between the legal process in general and the system of adjudication
that forms a part of that process. By definition (or almost so), the legal
process, at least on the civil side, is concerned with resolving disputes. It
includes all the means by which people may do so-not only adjudication, but
informal settlement discussions, more formal means often labeled as
"alternative dispute resolution" to distinguish them from adjudication,
administrative procedures, and legislative change. Most disputes are resolved
without adjudication, but some remain resistant to such resolution. For these,
the adjudicative system is at hand.
In a sense, the adjudicative system does not resolve disputes. Indeed, if
dispute resolution were the principal goal of our system, we might well ask
ourselves why we have such a confrontational adjudicative system rather than
one more geared toward finding cooperative solutions. Rather than resolve
disputes, the adjudicative system takes disputes that have not been
resolved-and that may be irresolvable-and determines and implements the
substantive rights of the parties as best it can, subject to constraints such as
cost, uncertainty, and the system's own rules of procedure. Because it is
oriented toward adjudicating rights rather than crafting solutions, there is an
austerity about the adjudicative system; it is limited in the results it reaches in
ways that the parties, were they to deal with one another outside of the
adjudicative system, would not be. But this austere procedure is the service it
offers when all else fails; we might say that it is really the alternative method
for dispute resolution-or, in a fitting play on Clausewitz, dispute resolution
by other means.'92
On the criminal side, dispute resolution seems an even poorer
characterization of the Anglo-American system. Sometimes, by the time the
lawyers are involved, there is no real conflict; the accused knows he has done
wrong and must be punished for it. Perhaps more significantly, even if the
defense and the prosecution resolve any dispute between them, they usually
cannot-as most civil parties can-simply settle the matter between them and
avoid court altogether. If criminal punishment is to be imposed, it must be by
the court, and the court is not bound, in determining the sentence, by the
parties' agreement.' 93 "The classical liberal concept of the criminal process,"
192. Cf. CARL VON CLAuSEWrrZ ON WAR 87 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret trans.. Princeton Univ.
Press 1976) (1832) ("[W]ar is ... a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.-).
Litigation is to war as dispute resolution is to diplomacy, and the analogy is not a distant one. See
American Int'l Adjustment Co. v. Galvin, 86 F.3d 1455, 1468 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner. CJ.. dissenting)
(noting "the emotional and fiercely adversarial character of war with which of course litigation has often
been compared"). Even adapting the famous Clausewitz passage to litigation is not original. See Dc
Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicar., 770 F.2d 1385, 1386 (5th Cir. 1985) ("Clausewitz once described war
as politics carried on by other means. Here it could be said that litigation is war carried on by other
means.").
193. See FED. R. CRIM. P. I I(e)(3)-(4) (providing for acceptance and rejection of plea agreements).
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as described by Damaka, "as a dispute between the individual and the
state"' 94 does not hold water, if it ever did. Indeed, Damagka's description
of the Continental view of criminal justice as "serv[ing] the realization of state
policy toward crime"'95 seems much closer to the mark.
96
What, then, are we to make of party control of the boundaries of legal
proceedings-that is, of the general principle emphasized by Dama~ka that
only contested matters need be resolved? The answer most likely lies in our
individual rights orientation: The right to proceed to litigation is one that a
person can exercise or waive as he chooses. If he does proceed to litigation,
he has the right to raise a material issue that appears to favor him; if he does
not, it is unlikely that anyone will do it for him.
2. Rights and the Adversary System
The relationship between individual rights and the adversary system bears
further examination. Reading Dama~ka, one might gain the perception that,
because the common law system is adversarial, it gives litigants a range of
rights. 197 There is a measure of truth to that; for the most part, though,
viewing matters from this perspective puts the cart before the horse. One
indication that rights are prior to adversarialness is the solicitude with which
courts treat the rights and interests of those other than the parties originally
before them, through such mechanisms as compulsory joinder and
intervention, 19 a range of protections for unnamed class members in class
actions,'99 and the exercise of broad freedom, unrestrained by the parties'
presentations, to determine both the law and the underlying "legislative
facts.
Indeed, to a large extent, what we call the adversary system exists because
of, and indeed is the coalescence of, rights of the parties in court.2"' I cannot
mount a full historical demonstration of this proposition, but the history I
offered in Part II is strongly suggestive. One might logically expect the deep
and strong English attachment to conceptions of individual rights to breed
194. DAMAtKA, supra note 1, at 120.
195. Id. at 112.
196. Damaika acknowledges that there is an element of this view in the Anglo-American system. See
id. at 110 n.69.
197. See, e.g., id. at 79 (arguing that, in a system marked by party-driven proceedings, "it is vitally
important that each party have an immediate opportunity to challenge sources of information presented by
the opponent").
198. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19, 24.
199. See, e.g., FED. R. Ctv. P. 23(a)(3), (c)(2), (e); see also Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S.
Ct. 2231 (1997) (rejecting certification of class under Rule 23(b)(3) on the grounds that the requirements
of predominance of common questions and adequacy of representation were not satisfied).
200. See FED. R. EVID. 201(a) advisory committee's note; see also sources cited supra note 112.
201. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHIcS 13 (1990) ("[T]he adversary
system represents far more than a simple model for resolving disputes. Rather, it consists of a core of basic
rights that recognize and protect the dignity of the individual in a free society.").
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demands for, and societal receptivity to, a large role for the parties in
litigation. Recall also that the right to confront accusing witnesses became
highly visible-at least through defendant demands and parliamentary
support-in sixteenth-century treason jurisprudence.? This occurred long
before defense lawyers were generally present at criminal trials, and in the
context of a system that, with active judges often sounding like prosecutors,
was not adversarial in any modem sense of the term.
We have here, then, at least part of a solution for a problem that appears
to perplex Damaka: the fact that, even as support for the rule against hearsay
is diminishing in common law countries, Europe appears to be embracing some
right of confrontation for criminal defendants. 3 Although the common law
hearsay ban is excessively broad, the confrontation right is an important one
that has value even in a nonadversarial system. If Europe is becoming
increasingly sensitive to that right, so much the better. By doing so, it takes a
step toward an adversary system, but the confrontation right in itself does not
create such a system.
Now consider some of the panoply of rights of the criminal defendant in
the modem American system: the right to have a formal accusation; - ' the
presumption of innocence and a very high standard of persuasion;2 the right
to have the facts tried by a jury, °6 which for several centuries has of
necessity been a largely passive factfinder; 27 the right to effective assistance
of counsel;20 1 the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses;'"
and the right to secure helpful evidence.10 With just those rights, we could
assemble a very substantial-though of course not fully complete-picture of
American criminal adjudication and of what gives it an adversarial, combative
nature.
On the other hand, note that our system of criminal adjudication is not
"competitive"-a term sometimes used by Damagka apparently as a synonym
202. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86.
203. See DAMAtKA, supra note I, at 16 n.24. 81. 150 & n.15.
204. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . .).
205. See, e.g., Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) (holding the presumption of innocence
to be "a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice"); In re Winship. 397 U.S. 358,
359 (1970) (setting forth "beyond a reasonable doubt" as the constitutionally required standard of
persuasion).
206. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .... ).
207. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 80, at 1170-71 (discussing the transformation from self-informing
to passive juries).
208. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.").
209. See id. ("Mhe accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against
him .... ").
210. See id. ("[The accused shall enjoy the right... to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor .... ").
1998]
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for "adversarial" 2' '-in the sense of being evenhanded, the way the rules of
most contests are. On the contrary, it is rife with asymmetries, and many of
these are also attributable to defendants' rights: the presumption of innocence
and high standard of persuasion; 2 2  the right not to testify;21 3  the
prosecution's obligation to turn over significant evidence to the defense;
214
and the defendant's ability to present some information to the jury
notwithstanding generally applicable evidentiary rules.215 Thus, to a large
extent, it is individual rights that limit, as well as generate, the adversarial
nature of our system. 2
1 6
On the civil side, these asymmetrical rights are absent. Indeed, the
emphasis tends to be on a fairness of symmetry. 217 Because of this greater
emphasis on symmetry, Dama~ka's attempt to paint civil and criminal
procedure with the same brush, emphasizing a similarity of mission, is
somewhat jarring. Even if, at some broad level, the two types of procedures
have similar missions, the constraints under which they operate are radically
different, and this gives them shapes that are very dissimilar.
3. The Adversary System and the Shape of Evidentiary Law
In emphasizing the importance of individual rights, I do not mean to deny
that the adversary system has a significant impact on Anglo-American
evidentiary law. The "best evidence" principle discussed above in connection
with concentrated proceedings 2t8 -the idea that excluding an item of
evidence may be beneficial in inducing presentation of a substitute that is bet-
ter from the court's point of view-would make little sense outside the context
of a system of party-dominated evidentiary presentation. The fact that the
parties, acting in their self-interest, produce the evidence means that there will
211. See, e.g., DAMASKA, supra note 1, at 99 (referring to the "competitive evidentiary method").
212. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
213. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person ... shall be compelled in any case to be a witness
against himself .... ).
214. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
215. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(l)-(2); Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987) (holding that the
defendant had a constitutional right to testify notwithstanding the applicable state rule excluding testimony
by witnesses whose memory had been hypnotically refreshed); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284
(1973) (holding that a murder defendant's due process rights were violated by state evidence rules that
barred him from introducing a confession made by another person).
216. Some asymmetries favor the prosecution. For example, in the federal criminal system, in which
formal discovery is relatively confined, grand jury proceedings effectively give the prosecutor a
nonreciprocal opportunity for discovery. In virtually all jurisdictions, the prosecutor can grant immunity
to a witness she thinks will testify favorably, but the defense cannot. These asymmetries, too, take the
system away from a norm of competitiveness.
217. The key rights that help to generate the adversarial system-the rights to have assistance of
counsel, to gather and present helpful evidence, and to confront adverse testimony-are present, though
in significantly altered form. Parties may be represented by counsel, but generally only if they pay for it.
The right to gather evidence is, in some respects, stronger in civil than in criminal litigation, while the right
to confront adverse testimony is weaker, lacking explicit constitutional support.
218. See supra Section III.B.
1962
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be a good deal of chaff among the wheat-evidence that, from the court's
standpoint, is not worth the time it takes to present or might lead a jury to
disregard norms that the law wishes to impose. Furthermore, the adversary
system, being so natural a part of common law jurists' approach to
adjudication, "grooves sensibilities," in Damagka's phrase. 1 9 This factor may
lead to broad tolerance for competitive behavior that seems unlikely, in itself,
to advance objectives of the adjudicative system (for example, efforts to
confuse a truthful witness). Sometimes, too, the system creates pressure for
competitive evenhandedness, which is sensible in some circumstances2' and
not in others.2 t
At the same time, however, we must bear in mind that core aspects of the
adversary system reflect deep underlying values. Damaka shows how partisan
presentation of the facts departs from the methods used in everyday
extrajudicial inquiry, and how the "single integrated inquiry" of Continental
proof-taking is much closer to those processes. m Putting aside the question
of which structure tends to yield more accurate results,m this is clearly
correct. Judges in the common law system do have considerable flexibility to
alter the usual order of proof so as to "make the interrogation and presentation
effective for the ascertainment of the truth."' Taken too far, however,
219. DAMA KA, supra note 1, at 119.
220. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1) (allowing the prosecutor to rebut evidence offered by the
accused concerning a pertinent trait of his own character).
221. For example, to the extent that concern over symmetry is the reason for limiting cnminal
defendants' ability to take discovery, see DAMASKA, supra note I, at 117. I think the argument is
unpersuasive because the parties are in such asymmetrical situations from the outset. Cf. Richard D.
Friedman, An Asymmetrical Approach to the Problem of Peremptones. 28 CRit. L BULL- 507. 517-19
(1992) (analyzing the "nonproblem of asymmetry" and emphasizing that "criminal trials are not about even-
handedness"); Robert Laurence, The Bothersome Need for Asymmetry in An) Federally Dictated Rule of
Recognition for the Enforcement of Money Judgements Across Indian Reservation Boundaries. 27 CONN.
L. REv. 979, 993-1001 (1995) (discussing the bothersome need for asymmetry more broadly than the title
suggests). Another ground sometimes cited for limiting discovery by the defense is the fear that it would
facilitate perjury and bribery or intimidation of witnesses. See. e.g.. State v. Tune. 98 A.2d 881. 884. 893
(NJ. 1953).
222. See DAMA.'KA, supra note I, at 91-94.
223. Dama.ka spends some time on the much discussed issue of whether party-dominated or official-
dominated factfinding systems are more likely to be accurate. He is uncertain about the answer, as am I.
though we both tend to favor the systems of our native lands.
In describing the presentation of facts by parties, Dama~ka uses the nice metaphor of car headlights:
two beams of light, narrow but presumably focused and intense. See id. at 92, 100. Is their illumination
more likely to be useful than that from a diffuse source? I do not know for sure, but the question need not
be asked with respect to factfinding in general. Instead, we are concerned principally with factfinding in
party disputes-factfinding that usually has its primary impact on the two parties. In that limited context.
it certainly seems plausible that narrowness of focus is a tolerable cost for intensity of illumination.
Moreover, as I have pointed out, when the interests of others are involved, the common law system adjusts
the two-party model to take their perspectives into account: the light available to the system is not limited
to two beams. Note also my suggestion, see supra note 187. that at least in civil litigation the adversary
system better internalizes costs and benefits.
224. FED. R. EVID. 611(a). Dama~ka emphasizes the common law tendency not to take testimony in
narrative form. See DAMA KA, supra note I, at 92-93. But there is a great deal of flexibility on this score.
See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 611(a) advisory committee's note. Narrowly phrased questions, at least on direct
examination, are not endemic to the system, and a party witness who wishes to tell her story without much
lawyerly interruption is ordinarily given a chance to do so. Narrow questions often do have advantages,
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reordering would interfere with the parties' ability to tell a story in a
persuasive way. Such an ability is very important if the parties are to feel, at
the end of the case, that they have had their "day in court. ''22 At the same
time, as I noted above,1 6 this ability rests in tension with the right of the
adversary to cross-examine promptly. Thus, for example, the extent to which
cross-examination may go beyond matters raised on direct has long been a
controversial matter in common law jurisdictions. 27
Much the same can be said about the other principal common law
departure from ordinary cognitive processes identified by Dama~ka, namely the
passive factfinder. A factfinder, whether judge or jury, could be moderately
active without endangering deep values of our system. Such activism would
certainly have some benefits. 8 But a greater degree of activism is likely to
interfere with the parties' presentation of their own cases and give one side or
the other the sense that it is facing an extra adversary.
I have argued that, to the extent that it makes sense to speak of the
mission of the common law adjudicative system, that mission is the accurate
determination of the rights of the parties, subject to various constraints.
Prominent among those constraints are procedural rights of the parties that help
to shape both evidentiary law and the adversary system in which it operates.
Some of those rights would still have substantial force even in a system that
does not depend on party control over the factfinding process.
IV. CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE
I have argued here that the common law evidentiary system is largely
oriented around the protection of individual rights and related important values.
I do not take a Panglossian view of the system, however: It could be improved
very substantially. Indeed, much of the significant work of evidence scholars
concerns ways in which the system might be altered, in ways large and small,
conceptually or in practice. Of course, the system will change over time,
whether for better or worse. It has always been in a process of continual
however, in avoiding irrelevancies or other testimony that should not be presented and in enhancing the
focus and dramatic power of the testimony.
225. This factor may be an important part of the reason that parties appear to find an adversarial
system preferable to an inquisitorial one. See John Thibaut et al., Procedural Justice as Fairness, 26 STAN.
L. REV. 1271, 1287-88 & n.37 (1974).
226. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
227. See FED. R. EVID. 611(b) advisory committee's note (summarizing the debate and concluding that
"[t]he matter is not one in which involvement at the appellate level is likely to prove fruitful"); I
MCCORMICK, supra note 45, § 21, at 83-86 (describing jurisdictions' different rules on the scope of cross-
examination).
228. As Damalka perceptively points out, activism not only helps the factfinder absorb information,
but also gives the parties a better understanding of what the "cognitive needs" of the factfinder are. See
DAMA9KA, supra note I, at 96; cf. CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF TIlE UNITED
STATES 62 (1928) (stating, in a description of the receptivity of able appellate lawyers to questions from
the court, that these lawyers "prefer an open attack to a masked battery").
1964 [Vol. 107: 1921
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change-in response to changes in institutions, technology, ideology,
demographics, and other factors-and there is every reason to believe the
process will continue. The Anglo-American system is, as Dama~ka points out,
characteized by "great flexibility,"2 9 and so it is marked by steady,
nondisruptive change. Damaka, however, argues that with the crumbling of
the institutional pillars will come more disruptive change. I am rather skeptical.
Consider first what Damagka calls the "scientization of proof'"-that
is, the growing importance of science and technology in proof. I believe
Damaka overstates the significance and imminence of this phenomenon. For
example, I suspect that before very long DNA evidence will have much the
feel that evidence about radar guns, fingerprints, and photographs now has.
-3
Where difficult issues remain, appellate decisionmaking will presumably
continue to seek some degree of uniformity. Meanwhile, dissatisfaction with
the way in which scientific evidence is gathered and presented will most likely
continue to create pressure for change. -3" But the rights orientation of the
Anglo-American system, I anticipate, will confine the extent of change: Any
system that appears to deprive the litigants of their ability to present their sides
through plausible-sounding experts whose views favor their own would almost
certainly face insurmountable resistance.
Damagka also predicts an increase in what he calls "differentiation of the
legal process"Z3-use of new or alternative forms of dispute resolution. He
is probably right; indeed, he correctly points out that the change is already
229. DAMAtKA, supra note 1, at 151-52. In a session devoted to discussion of Evidence Law Adrift
at the recent Hastings Symposium on Truth and Its Rivals in the Law of Evidence at Hastings College of
the Law, Sept. 26-27, 1997, my colleague Sam Gross made a valuable point cutting against the view that
evidence law changes dramatically over time. Whereas American civil procedure of today would seem very
foreign to a lawyer of a century ago, Gross pointed out. American evidence law would seem quite familiar,
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure created a mild revolution but the Federal Rules of Evidence left
prevailing structures intact.
230. DAMAtKA, supra note 1, at 145.
231. Scientific knowledge is expanding rapidly, of course. But there has always been a moving frontier
of scientific knowledge that creates professional debate and stretches lay understanding, and a second level
of scientific knowledge that is sufficiently accepted, at least by the understanding few. that its implications
can be presented in easily digested form. DNA evidence now lies near the first frontier, and so it creates
complexities for the adjudicative system. Evidence from radar guns, by contrast, is now well within the
second level; I doubt that most jurors have a good understanding of how radar guns work. and we do not
spend time informing them, but the underlying principles are not controversial and the consequences are
readily understandable.
232. Damaka suggests that "[a] better way of conveying scientific data [than adversarial oral
presentation] would be to prepare briefs that could carefully be studied by the trial judge in advance of the
trial." DAMASKA, supra note 1, at 146. The expert's report required by the new FED. R. Civ P.
26(a)(2)(B)-in jurisdictions that adhere to that rule-is a major step in that direction. For other interesting
suggestions on how our system might better accommodate information from experts, see Samuel R. Gross,
Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 1113, 1208-30. The pressure for change is by no means limited to the
Anglo-American system. DamaAka writes that "the Anglo-American procedural environment is poorly
adapted to the use of scientific information," DAMASKA. supra note 1. at 147. and he may be right. There
is some dissatisfaction in Europe. however, with the Continental system's reliance on the scientific
establishment, a concern acknowledged by Damagka. See id. at 150-51.
233. DAMAtKA, supra note I, at 147.
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underway,234 and it seems likely to continue. Moreover, Damagka is probably
right in suggesting that increased differentiation is a good thing. 235 Recent
developments in tobacco and asbestos litigation are a useful reminder that
standard adversarial litigation is a clumsy tool, even in adapted form, to
address mass torts. 6 In many contexts, it is also a poor way to effect
significant political adjustments.z 7 Nevertheless, even while recognizing that
the needs of modern society put increasing emphasis on the "public interest"
238in litigation, we should not overmagnify the change. Common law
litigation has always had an impact on persons other than the immediate
parties, simply because it is how so much of our law is made. Indeed, some
defenders of the adversary system, in particular of its aggressive American
variant, have emphasized its role in providing a "desirable and orderly way of
resolving disputes of broad public significance.,,23' And yet even today, and
probably well into the next millennium, most workaday litigation has its
primary impact on the parties and a narrow circle of others who are intimately
connected to that litigation. It is both likely and desirable that, despite the
increasing differentiation of procedural forms, the forms that emerge will
continue to be constrained and largely shaped, as they have been for hundreds
of years, by solicitude for the rights of those persons.
Finally, I have a similar reaction to one other significant change that I
anticipate. I suspect that, at least outside the area of scientific evidence, the
supposed cognitive disabilities of jurors will play less of a role in evidentiary
rhetoric than they have over the last two centuries. Most obviously, as
Damagka argues, this may occur because of continued shrinkage in the scope
of litigation tried before a jury;240 evidentiary decisionmakers will likely
continue to use the absence of the jury as the occasion for loosening
exclusionary rules. Additionally, empirical research suggesting that jurors do
234. See id.
235. See id. at 147-49.
236. Whether or not the Supreme Court's decision in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct.
2231 (1997), was justified, the very real difficulties that beset the proposed settlement involved there-and
the fact that the Court rejected the settlement-are inescapable facts suggesting limitations on the usefulness
of class actions in this realm. Similarly, the supposed comprehensive settlement by state attorneys general
and several large tobacco companies is, in fact, a proposal for congressional action; of course, it is unlikely
that the proposal would have been supported by the companies were it not for the pressure created by
litigation.
237. Damaika cites Lisa Heinzerling, The Commercial Constitution, 1995 SUP. Cr. REv. 217, 247-48,
for "the difficulties of deciding environmental causes on the basis of information supplied by self-interested
parties." DAMA8KA, supra note 1, at 101 n.55.
238. See DAMAMKA, supra note 1, at 137-38.
239. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 453 (1963) (Harlan, J. dissenting); see also FREEDMAN, supra
note 201, at 18-20 (arguing that litigation expresses important public policies); Owen Fiss, Against
Settlement, 93 YALE LJ. 1073, 1089 (1984) ("[Some see] adjudication in essentially private terms ....
I, on the other hand, see adjudication in more public terms: Civil litigation is an institutional arrangement
for using state power to bring a recalcitrant reality closer to our chosen ideals.").
240. See DAMA KA, supra note 1, at 126-27.
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not fail to discount the weaknesses of evidence, 2- as well as analytical work
like Damaka's suggesting that jurors' vulnerabilities are unlikely in most
contexts to turn good evidence into bad,2' 2  may well persuade
decisionmakers that many evidentiary restrictions should be loosened. In some
settings, such a change would be all to the good. If removal of the cognitive
smoke screen focuses decisionmakers' attention on the potentially stronger
reasons supporting some evidentiary rules, that would be beneficial as well.
But the opposite consequence is also possible. Decisionmakers may take the
view that if they do not have to worry about cognitive disabilities of the
factfinder, there is little reason remaining to exclude highly probative
evidence. 4 3 Such a reaction would be unfortunate. The common law system
of evidence has a long tradition of constraining the search for truth in order to
serve broad policy considerations, including, most notably, the rights of
individuals. It does not always do so well or wisely, to be sure, and some of
the underlying considerations change over time. But this orientation and
individual rights that have enduring value are worthy anchors of our
evidentiary system. We should not forsake them.
241. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
242. See supra Subsection I.A.2.
243. I have in mind here particularly the question of whether an out-of-court statement should be
excluded as a violation of the confrontation right. The Supreme Court has tended to view the right in this
context as essentially a guarantor that "the trier of fact [will have] a satisfactory basis for cvaluating the
truth of the prior statement." California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970). The more confident the court
is in the trier of fact, therefore, the less it might be concerned about the confrontation right.
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